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  Abstract 
 
The proportion of public procurement is nowadays more than substantial; it 
amounts to all the goods and services that the State, perceived as both: central and 
local administrations, demands in order to assure the effective and sustainable 
functioning of the society. Moreover, as the procurement procedures aim at 
simultaneously achieving best value for money and high standards in non-financial 
matters (e.g. environment, social, innovation), efficient operations must be assured. 
Considering the context, protecting such an economic desirable market from unlawful 
practices (i.e. dumping strategies, illegal state aid, antitrust or corruption), that can 
otherwise harm the whole commercial balance, becomes the preoccupation of 
different areas of law. Furthermore, like privatization processes and public private 
partnerships, it represents a strategic point on each and every government’s agenda, 
fact that stimulated the research in this area. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  Table of Contents 
INTRODUCTION 6 
1.1 DEFINING THE CONCEPT 6 
1.2 QUESTION AND PURPOSE 9 
1.3 METHOD AND MATERIALS 9 
1.4 DELIMITATION 10 
1.5 STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 11 
CHAPTER I: ABNORMALLY LOW TENDERS 12 
2.1 DEFINING THE CONCEPT 12 
2.2 PREDATORY PRICING – STRATEGY OR ECONOMICAL JUSTIFICATION
 15 
2.3 DUMPING – STRICTO SENSU 21 
2.4 SEEKING RENEGOTIATIONS – ‘HOLD-UPS’ AND THE SUBSEQUENT 
CONDITIONAL PERFORMANCE 26 
CHAPTER II: STATE AID 29 
3.1 DEFINING THE CONCEPT 29 
3.2 MISUSED AID 33 
3.3 ILLEGAL STATE AID 36 
3.3.1 MARKET ECONOMY INVESTOR PRINCIPLE 37 
3.3.2 MARKET ECONOMY VENDOR PRINCIPLE 40 
3.3.3 PRIVATE CREDITOR TEST 42 
3.3.4 THE FRAMEWORK FOR FINANCING SGEIS 44 
3.3.5 PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS 46 
CHAPTER III: CARTELS AND CORRUPTION RELATED 
OFFENCES 48 
4.1 DEFINING THE CONCEPT 48 
4.2 CARTELS 51 
4.3 NE BIS IN IDEM 55 
4.4 CORRUPTION IN PUBLIC PROCUREMENT 57 
4.5 CORRUPTION IN LIBERALIZED MARKETS 62 
CONCLUSION 64 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 66 	  
 
 
	  List of abbreviations  
 
CJEU – Court of Justice of the European Union  
DG – Directorate General  
EU – European Union 
GC – General Court  
MEAT - Most Economically Advantageous Tender  
MEIP - Market Economy Investor Principle  
NCA – National Competition Authority  
OECD – Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development  
OFT - Office of Faire Trade  
R&D – Research and Development  
SGEI – Service of General Economic Interest  
TEU - Treaty of the European Union  
TFEU - Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union  
UK – United Kingdome  
 
 
 
 
 
 
	   6	  
Introduction 
1.1 Defining the concept 
 
 
Since the very beginning of modern legal thinking, contract theories have been 
drastically influenced by voluntarism theories; the ‘core’ element of the entire socio-
economical system was the contract, perceived as an ’autonomous manifestation of 
will’ with the power to ’bind on goods and conduct’ of the parties implicated in 
transactions. In this respect it should be noted that the post-Cartesian1 paradigm 
gathered most of the contractual views around the concept of ’will’.2 
Giving primacy to the same current of thought, from the sixteenth century on, 
the Common law courts had aligned to the idea that the ‘adequacy of consideration’ 
was unimportant to a bargain, and that this represented the ‘triumph of the free choice 
ideal’ almost a hundred years before even Hobbes developed the principle that ‘the 
value of all things contracted for is measured by the appetite of the contractors’.3 
On the other hand, turning to the current legal order, for contracting authorities 
belonging to the public sector, the rule of freedom to contract has, in a certain way, 
been ‘suspended’;4 this takes place as, when concluding the agreement, the awarding 
authority is constrained by the public procurement legislation in force. As a result, the 
procurement of desired products or services is subject to a competitive, non-
discriminatory, transparent, proportionate and based on equal treatment process, 
aimed at achieving both, financial and non-economical efficiencies.5 Having such a 
premise, the freedom of public authorities’ decision-making is substantially narrower 
than the one exercised by private firms.6 
This came as a result of the neo-liberal process of market emancipation in 
Europe that started with the creation of the internal market in the 1992 and the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Current of thought related to René Descartes’s opera. 
2 Horia Ciurtin, Concept of Price in The New Civil Code: A comparative perspective, SUBB 
Jurisprudentia No. 4 (2012) p. 110. 
3 P.S. Atiyah, The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract (Oxford, Clarendon Press 1979) p.167. 
4 Kristian Hartlev, Morten Wahl Liljenbøl, Changes to Existing Contracts Under the EU Public 
Procurement Rules and the Drafting of Review Clauses to Avoid the Need for a New Tender, (2013) 
Public Procurement Law Review No.2, p.52. 
5 Ruth Nielsen, Discrimination and equality in public procurement (2005), pp. 9-10, seen on 
Stockholm University’s webpage on 2014.01.19. 
6 Dacian Dragos and Roberto Caranta (eds.), Outside the EU Procurement Directives – Inside the 
Treaty? (Copenhagen, DJØF Publishing 2012) p. 214. 
	   7	  
enactment of the Public Procurement Directives.7 Ever since, public suppliers have to 
act under ‘normal’, free market conditions 8  without the option of developing 
preferences or protective behavior for certain undertakings. In the same time, 
liberalization (in the form of privatization) itself is carried out through public 
contracts and, in certain situations, this fact transforms the process into ‘competition 
for the market rather than on the market’;9 this second process found its roots in the 
disappearance of the assumption that the provision of public goods and services 
through monopolies was the most efficient way to deliver them.10  
As a result of the change of economical paradigm in Europe, the national 
governments must mostly purchase their necessary supplies through public tenders11 
(invitations to bid for a certain task, like renovation of a building, or provision of 
other services12) and deal in their endeavor with firms that, in their big majority, 
belong  to the private sphere.  
In this matter, the state in its ‘various central, regional and delegated 
manifestations’ is for sure the leading buyer of supplies, services and works in every 
sovereign territory;13 having this as a premise, the Court of Justice of the European 
Union (here and after, the CJEU) held that the term ‘state’ – implying public entity, 
must be interpreted in a functional and broad way, as, otherwise the purpose of the 
Directives would be jeopardized.14  
Taking a functional view, as part of the act of governance, procurement policy 
is also essential in solving non-economic problems (i.e. environmental) besides 
developing the private sector and certain areas of the industry (e.g. small and medium 
enterprises); moreover, in the European context, an efficient public procurement 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Older rules  /  guidelines governing existing contracts, seen on European Commission’s webpage on 
2014.01.22. 
8 Grit Skovgaard Ølykke, Abnormally Low Tenders, (Copenhagen, DJØF Publishing 2010) p. 23. 
9 Ibid. 
 10 Erika Szyszczak, The Regulation of the State in Competitive Markets in the EU (Portland: Hart 
Publishing 2007) p. 108. 
11 Grit Skovgaard Ølykke, op. cit., p. 23. 
12 Neil Andrews, Contract Law, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 2011) p. 71 
13 Allan Tyrrell, Becket Bedford (eds.), Public Procurement in Europe: Enforcement and Remedies, 
(Kent, Mackay of Chatham PLC 1997) p.1. 
14 Peter-Armin Trepte, Public Procuremnet in the EC, (Oxfordshire, CCH Editions Limited 1993) 
p.102. 
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policy is the fundament of guaranteeing the function of the internal market due to the 
fact that it provides the Union to collect ‘full return’ from its continuous enlarged.15 
Furthermore, as a novel non-financial tendency, it is currently agreed that 
where the public authority decides to award a contract to the bidder who submits the 
most economically advantageous tender (here and after, MEAT), it may use what the 
doctrine calls ‘strategic procurement’. This comes as support of society objectives, 
such as ‘fostering innovation, respecting the environment, combating climate change 
and improving employment, public health and social conditions’,16 provided that these 
are connected to ‘the subject matter’ of the agreement, do not confer discretion of 
choice on the authority and, in the same time, respect the procurement principles.17 
The abovementioned framework is established with the scope of achieving 
better value for money, guarantee the choice of the most economically advantageous 
option, assure undistorted competition on the market and foster the functioning of the 
internal market with the sole scope of increasing the welfare of the final beneficiary 
that in most of the cases is the European citizen. In this matter, the legal system 
protecting the process from severe cost unbalances is mostly composed by the public 
procurement internal rules, competition legislation (lato sensu) and criminal law 
provisions. 
When it comes to the synergy between Competition law and public 
procurement  it has been considered that the first has two main protective functions; 
first, referring to possible cartels, there is the aim for horizontal competition and not 
cooperation between undertakings; second, there is the purpose of eliminating abuse 
of dominance in both sides (from and against the awarding authority).18 
On the other hand, the rules of public procurement are aimed to prevent issues 
that would, in a second phase, engage the effects of Competition law provisions (e.g. 
the case of direct award of contracts or deliberate overcompensation that would attract 
the application of State aid rules).19  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Eshien Chong, Carine Staropoli, Anne Yvrande-Billon, Auction versus Negotiation in Public 
Procurement: Looking for Empirical Evidence (2010) p.2, seen on Sciences de l’Homme et de la 
Société webpage on 2014.01.24. 
16 Jörgen Hettne, Strategic Use of Public Procurement – Limits and Opportunities, Swedish Institute of 
European Studies, European Policy Analysis, No. 7, (2013), p. 18. 
17 Ibid. p. 9. 
18 Sánchez Graells, Public Procurement and the EU Competition Law, (Oxford, Hart Publishingp 
2011)  p.196. 
19 Grit Skovgaard Ølykke, op. cit., p. 25. 
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Also, a more severe system aiming at protecting the procurement environment 
and which sometimes overlaps with competition remedies - especially in the antitrust 
dimension - is represented by Criminal law. While promoting more transparent 
procedures by pleading for opened calls for tenders and efficient monitoring 
mechanisms,20 criminalists require such ideals with the purposes of eliminating the 
system vulnerabilities to corruption acts. 
 
1.2 Question and purpose 
 
As for many years state expenditure trough public procurement procedures has 
been at the forefront of the economic activities in Member States’ markets, this thesis 
aims at identifying and analyzing market behavior that can hinder the process per se 
and as a consequence affect the market with subsequent implications in the daily life; 
from a broad perspective, the paper is mostly focusing on areas related to the free 
movement of services, competition and criminal law. Having this as a premise, its aim 
is to identify and develop on issues having the effect of unbalancing the consideration 
regarding contracts in which one of the parties is a public undertaking or the state; 
however, it will mostly focus on cases in which the state body is the buyer (i.e. public 
procurement) but will also consider the price criteria in privatization contracts and 
public private partnerships.  Exemplifying, the paper shall emphasize on ‘dumping’ 
practices that can lead to ‘abnormally low tenders’, assess on the ways in which the 
state itself can affect the market and analyze economical behavior that can engage 
antitrust or criminal liability.  
 
1.3 Method and materials 
 
In the work, the author has used the traditional (dogmatic) legal method; it is 
carried out by mostly using qualitative analysis on International Treaties, European 
Union (here and after, EU) primary legislation (i.e. the Treaty of the European Union, 
here and after, TEU and the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union, here 
and after, TFEU), secondary legislation - de lege lata and de lege ferenda, case-law 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 M. Gabriel, Corruption crimes in relation to public procurement (2012), p. 7, seen on the European 
Parliament’s webpage on 2014.01.28. 
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(with its role in the EU judicial methodology), opinions of advocates generals, 
Commission decisions, soft-law (i.e. guidelines), Member States’ legislation followed 
by jurisprudence and also relevant doctrine (emanation of reputed scholars, valuable 
works of practitioners or working papers from the European bodies). When 
considering these sources, there will however be a slight usage of quantitative 
analysis, especially when it comes to statistics. 
 The juridical analysis can be considered to be an empirical one, based on 
concrete facts presented to prove a hypothesis. Moreover, in some situations I will 
make comparison with the United States of America (here and after, USA) legal 
system. However, having a panoramic view on the paper, it can be said that a 
conceptual perspective can be identified as well; this happens due to the behavioral 
and economic theories (e.g. game theory) that come to complete the legal elements of 
the thesis.  
In the same time, the research is an analytical one as I am using facts and 
information already available and am considering them in order to make a consistent 
reasoning on different issues and emphasize on possible remedies; however, the 
outcome will be the result of the complicated interaction of different law branches: 
civil (lato sensu), public procurement, competition and criminal law; in subsidiary, by 
assessing on the different institutions belonging to these judicial areas the same 
complex result is reached as, most of the times they intertwine.  
 
1.4 Delimitation 
 
The thesis aims at identifying and developing on the issues presented in the 
problem statement from a purely EU law perspective. In this resort, even though there 
shall be decisions cited from national courts’ jurisprudence, they will come as result 
of Union law enforcement or as a consequence of a breach of the EU’s exigencies. 
When it comes to the civil-contractual law part of the paper, elements related 
to this area will only be developed to the extent to which it will be necessary to prove 
the negative effect of the different practices on the public procurement / privatization 
contract consideration. 
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In the area of public procurement law, I will just emphasize on the most often 
breached legal demands and, afterwards, on remedies provided by the resort 
legislation.  
In the competition field, the paper will deal with practices falling under the 
application of Article 101 TFEU (i.e. cartel practices), Article 102 TFEU (i.e. abuse 
of dominance in the form of predatory pricing) and Article 107 (i.e. illegal State aid); 
it must also be emphasized that the privatization legislation shall be mainly analyzed 
in relation to the last mentioned article.  
Finally, the criminal law study will only be of interest in matters of corruption 
crimes, most ‘popular’ in the area discussed.  
Summing up, it can be interfered that the thesis will focus on unlawful matters 
that can lead to an unbalanced public (understood as both, public procurement, public 
private partnership and privatization) contract and will exclude from its area of 
interest legit legal means that can have the same unbalancing effect (e.g. lawful and 
legal State aid, legit pricing mechanisms, unforeseeability). 
 
1.5 Structure of the Thesis 
 
The first chapter of the paper will deal with problems like ‘hold-ups’, 
predatory pricing, different ‘dumping’ possibilities and will slightly touch on the State 
aid issue however, without developing on it at this stage. All of these practices will be 
placed under the abnormally low tenders ‘umbrella’. There will be a permanent 
interaction between typical law assessments (including study of compared law with 
the USA) and more abstract economic theories. 
The second one shall substantively assess on the way in which State aid can 
distort competition and affect the consideration in public procurement, public private 
partnership and privatization processes. In this section I will analyze the state as 
holding not just the positive obligation of assuring compliance with EU rules but also, 
its negative obligation to abstain from intervention on the market that can distort 
competition and as well, affect the procurement market. 
The third and last chapter shall consider the link between the competition 
perspective on antitrust behavior and the criminal remedies for such issues. Moreover, 
as a link between the two kinds of liability (i.e. administrative and criminal), I shall 
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also emphasize on the discouraging double punishment that is also validated under the 
ne bis in idem principle.  
 
Chapter l: Abnormally low tenders  
2.1 Defining the concept 
 
Nowadays, as result of the economic crisis, firms are willing to submit 
‘uneconomic or unsustainable’ tender prices with the sole hope of assuring their 
survival on the market; as a result, such behavior rises the risk for very poor 
contractual performance, create problems in the supply chains and, as a result, injure 
the economic environment.21 
Moreover, poor markets prove to be good contexts for big companies to 
eliminate their competitors. Even though, dominance is not per se prohibited under 
EU law,22 financially potent undertakings, within a limited period of time, are 
sometimes strategically cutting prices to uncompetitive rates in order to eliminate or 
‘discipline’ other market players; they afterwards raise long run prices to a supra-
competitive level, inflicting a lengthy injury on final consumers’ costs.23 
At the same time, underperforming undertakings can benefit from illegal state 
incentives or misuse such resources when legitimately received in order to artificially 
survive or abuse in the competitive environment. 
 Also, deriving unfair advantages is not always the appanage of governmental 
intervention in the market; firms can also have their own ‘dumping’ strategies in order 
to cut expenses and be able to deliver a lower final price.  
As it shall be further developed, in situations where a tender appears to be 
abnormally low, the rules on Public Procurement, Competition and State aid law are 
currently providing legal basis for the analysis of the tender, each empowered with its 
own enforcement system.24 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Procurement advice note 3, Construction Works Procurement seen on Northern Ireland’s Minister of 
Finance and Personnel webpage on 2014.01.29. 
22 Hans Henrik Lidgard, Competition Classics – Materials & cases on European Competition Law and 
Practice, (Lund, Media-Tryck 2010) p. 229. 
23 Einer Elhauge, Damine Geradin, Global Competition Law and Economics, (Portland, Hart 
Publishing 2007) p. 314. 
24 Grit Skovgaard Ølykke, op. cit., p. 26. 
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Having enounced the premises, Article 57 of Directive 2004/17/EC 
coordinating the procurement procedures of entities operating in the water, energy, 
transport and postal services and Article 55 of Directive 2004/18/EC on the 
coordination of procedures for the award of public works contracts, public supply 
contracts and public service contracts (here and after, the Procurement Directives) 
provide with remedies for cases in which ‘abnormally low tenders’ are not either legal 
or economical justified.  
In an early report, the Commission gave general guidelines and stated that a 
tender is assumed to be abnormally low if ‘is not providing a margin for a normal 
level of profit’25 and the participant cannot explain his price on the basis of the 
‘economy of the construction method, the technical solution chosen, the exceptionally 
favorable conditions available or the originality of the work proposed’.26 In this 
matter, awarding authorities are in the position to reject tenders that seem to be 
abnormally low in relation to any of the relevant elements of the award criteria and 
not only price, where the award rule is that of the most economically advantageous 
offer. 27  
However, if an awarding authority uses the MEAT criteria, this must be 
clearly stipulated in the tender documentation; in this way specifications must include 
‘which criteria it applies to the award and the order of importance for each 
criterion’.28  
Considering the future, the award criteria in the new Directives29 is firstly 
based on the MEAT standards and as a result, more emphasis is placed on ‘social 
aspects, innovative characteristics, or environmental considerations’.30 However, it 
must be said from an early stage that the transposition period for the two new pieces 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 It however does not define what is a normal level of profit but indicates that the European or national 
competition legislation on pricing must adequately be respected.  
26 Prevention, Detection and Elimination of Abnormally Low Tenders in the European Construction 
Industry seen at GCI Union’s webpage on 2014.02.03. 
27 Sánchez Graells Albert, Rejection of Abnormally Low and Non-Compliant Tenders in EU Public 
Procurement: A Comparative View on Selected Jurisdictions (2013), European Procurement Law 
Series, Vol. 6, No. 4, p. 2. 
28 Directive 2004/17/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council coordinating the procurement 
procedures of entities operating in the water, energy, transport and postal services sectors [2004] OJ 
L134/1, Recital, para. 55. 
29 Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council on public procurement and 
repealing Directive 2004/18/EC [2014] OJ L 94/65 and Directive 2014/25/EU of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on procurement by entities operating in the water, energy, transport and 
postal services sectors and repealing Directive 2004/17/EC [2014] L 94/243. 
30 New EU-rules on public procurement - ensuring better value for money seen on the European 
Parliament’s webpage on 2014.02.03. 
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of legislation is by April 18th 2016;31 until then, the actual provisions can be still 
relied on. 
By giving primacy to such an award system the ‘abnormally low tender’ test 
will shift from a price oriented assessment to a more complicated analysis of 
likelihood of performance capacity. In addition, as there are different pieces of 
legislation addressed to specific sectors of activity and each contracting authority 
belonging to these sectors might have its own preferences, the concept of ‘abnormally 
low tenders’ must be assessed for each agreement in accordance with the ‘specific 
purpose it is intended to fulfill’32 and in relation to the functional requirements 
mentioned in the tender documentation.33 Exemplifying, there might be cases where 
the award criterion will be primarily based on environmental features (e.g. the 
undertaking that uses the lowest level of emissions for the project), social criterion 
(e.g. the undertaking that has a performing social corporate responsibilities policy34) 
or situations in which contracting authorities will still use the lowest price system and 
evade the MEAT method.  
Shifting to the procedural part of the analysis, as already stated in the 
introductions, Directives are the instruments used to harmonize and regulate this area. 
Furthermore, as ‘directives are binding to the end to be achieved,’ they leave some 
choice as to the form and method opened to Member States.35 
In this matter, a procedure on which national laws have autonomy to regulate 
is whether, once the awarding authority has identified an offer to be abnormally low 
after completing the binding contradictory investigation procedure, there is the 
express duty to reject it or, if the public entity can allow it on grounds of overriding 
considerations, which are always subject to a proportionality assessment.36 In this 
matter, some national setups require the rejection of abnormally low tenders (e.g. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Directive 2014/25/EU, art. 106. 
32 AG Opinion, Joined Cases C-285/99 and C-286/99 Impresa Lombardini SpA — Impresa Generale di 
Costruzioni  [2001] I-09233 para. 35. 
33 Directive 2004/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the coordination of 
procedures for the award of public works contracts, public supply contracts and public service contracts 
[2004] OJ L 134/114 art. 23. 
34 John Robinson Jr., Social Public Procurement: Corporate Responsibility without Regulation (2013), 
p.3 seen at SSRN’s webpage on 2014.02.06. 
35 Paul P. Craig, Gráinne de Búrca, EU Law: Text, Cases and Materials, 5th Edition (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2011) p. 106. 
36 Sánchez Graells Albert, Rejection of Abnormally Low and Non-Compliant Tenders in EU Public 
Procurement: A Comparative View on Selected Jurisdictions, p. 9. 
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Germany, Poland) while others leave this to the appreciation of the contracting 
authority (e.g. Romania, Denmark).37 
However, all member states are expressis verbis prohibited from introducing 
rules requiring the ‘automatic exclusion’ from procedures for the award of public 
contracts of certain tenders calculated on purely mathematical formulas, instead of 
constraining the awarding authority to apply the inter partes examination 
proceeding.38 
Having outlined the general framework of the concept, in the next sections the 
author shall engage in a more substantive analysis regarding the type of practices 
having the role of artificially lowering the bids. 
 
2.2 Predatory pricing – strategy or economical justification 
 
Public procurement rules protect competition in an important way,  as ‘means 
to achieve best value for money and to ensure the legitimacy of purchasing decisions’; 
on the other hand, competition is perceived as an instrument permitting the public 
authority to gain the benefits of the competitive pressure developed between 
participating bidders.39 
According to the estimates by the European Commission, the expenditure of 
the public sector amounts up to 19% of the EU gross domestic product;40 also, each 
year, the value of public procurement measures up to about EUR 420 billion.41 In this 
regard, having the access to public contracts on the long run makes undertakings 
consider not only legit market pressure but also uncompetitive tactics to get read of 
their concurrence.   
Game theory is one economical abstraction that explains ‘the roots of such 
market issues;’ during time, scholars developing on the theory have given many 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 Ibid. p. 10. 
38 Joined Cases C-285/99 and C-286/99 Impresa Lombardini SpA — Impresa Generale di Costruzioni, 
[2001] ECR I-09233 para. 45.  
39 Sánchez Graells Albert, Rejection of Abnormally Low and Non-Compliant Tenders in EU Public 
Procurement: A Comparative View on Selected Jurisdictions, p. 2. 
40 The economical value of all the produced goods and services within a country's territory in a specific 
time period. 
41 E-invoicing in public procurement: another step towards end-to-end e-procurement seen on 
Lithuanian Presidency of the EU’s webpage on 2014.01.28. 
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models related to strategic interaction between undertakings (e.g. raising rival’s 
costs).42  
Part of the game theory, strategic theory supporters (mostly developed by 
Chicago School of economics) consider that a firm with monopoly power may use 
predatory pricing to eliminate its competitors and implicit achieve monopoly power.43 
On the other hand, the neoclassical price theory offers alternative explanations 
(e.g. the deep pocket theory);44 its supporters are of the view that prices are always 
correctly established by the market itself and even dominant firms do not have the 
‘chance to engage in pricing games’.45 
Having the ideological dispute as a premise, distinction must be drawn 
between the submission of a tender with an apparently abnormally low price and 
predatory pricing per se, as the public procurement law does not require the price to 
be predatory in essence in order to be seen as abnormally low.46 In consequence, the 
line between ‘vigorous’ price competition and unlawful predation may be a thin one.47 
In this sense, when defending his interests, the claimant in an awarding procedure can 
either use the abnormally low pricing doctrine or exit the public procurement remedial 
framework and try proving an abuse of dominance in the matter of the predatory 
strategy. 
In this resort, in the newly Proposed Competition Directive regarding actions 
for damages under national law for infringements of the Competition Law provisions, 
the Commission aims at ensuring ‘the effective exercise of the victims’ right to full 
compensation that will include damnum emergens and lucrum cessans’ (e.g. the loss 
suffered by rallying with the procurement documentation exigencies and the possible 
profit that could have been gained as a result of the award).48 To this extent, this legal 
instrument looks like a very discouraging mechanism that will protect the 
procurement environment; the punitive character of the sanction will make 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 Hans Henrik Lidgard, Justin Pierce, Marcus Glader, Dynamic Competition, (Lund, Lund University 
2013) p. 41. 
43 Kenneth G. Elzinga, David E. Mills, Predatory Pricing and Strategic Theory, Georgetown Law 
Journal, Vol. 89, No. 543 (2001) p. 2478. 
44 Ibid. p.3. 
45 Giuliano Amato, Claus Dieter Ehlermann (eds.), EC Competition Law, (Portland, Hart Publishing 
2007) p. 250. 
46 Grit Skovgaard Ølykke , op. cit., p.115. 
47  Paul P. Craig, Gráinne de Búrca, op. cit., p. 1039. 
48 COM(2013)0404, Proposal for a Directive on certain rules governing actions for damages under 
national law for infringements of the competition law provisions of the Member States and of the 
European Union, para. 1. 
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undertaking think twice regarding the risks they assume when giving primacy to 
anticompetitive behavior. 
Going further, when assessing on the issue’s substance, most predatory pricing 
theories focus on the idea of cost levels.49 However, limiting the assessment to cost-
based models in a dynamic environment in which commercial reality ‘evolves along 
strategic lines’ would sometimes lead to a rigid analysis.50 
The CJEU compromised those views in the Tetra Pak case where it developed 
an economic test only to a certain extent; it stated that ‘prices below average variable 
costs51 must always be considered abusive, as the only economic purpose is the 
elimination of a competitor’. Secondly, prices ‘below average total52 costs but above 
average variable costs are only to be perceived as abusive ‘if an intention to eliminate 
can be shown’.53 
When trying to prove intent, the Commission looks for in-house files or 
business action plans belonging the dominant undertaking and that can indicate a 
predatory strategy. For example, a detailed exclusionary economical policy to 
sacrifice income in order to exclude a competitor (e.g. the plan of biding 20% bellow 
of the average award price in the past two years), to hinder entry or to pre-empt the 
emergence of a market (e.g. engaging in a ‘signaling’ practice) can been good proof 
for the imposition of a fine.54 Furthermore, some argue that predatory intent can be 
deduced from product proliferation, advertising, and other types of non-price 
behavior. 55 
Comparing, US Courts have detected intent from a showing that the firm ‘was 
neglecting present profits in order to create a market position in which it could charge 
supernormal ones.’56 However, federal judges have recently been moving from the 
classical cost based analysis to a more structural based test analysis. The ‘twin test – 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 Alison Jones, Brenda Suffrin, EU Competition Law, 5th edition, (Oxford, Oxford University Press 
2011) p. 393. 
50 Giuliano Amato, Claus Dieter Ehlermann, op. cit, p. 294. 
51 Average variable cost is a firm's variable costs (human resources, raw materials, etc.) divided by the 
quantity of output that it produces. 
52 Average cost or unit cost is equivalent to total cost divided by the number of goods finally produced. 
53 CJEU, Case C-333/94, Tetra Pak International SA v Commission of the European Communities 
[1996] ECR I-05951 para. 41. 
54 Report on Predatory Pricing, (2008) p.25 seen on International Competition Network’s webpage on 
2014.02.12. 
55 Dermot Nolan, Predatory Pricing in an Oligopolistic Framework Royal Holloway, University of 
London: Discussion Papers in Economics, No. 4 (1998), p.20. 
56 Charles W. Sherrer, Predatory Pricing: An Evaluation of Its Potential for Abuse under Government 
Procurement, Journal of Corporation Law, Vol. 6, No 3 (1981) p. 547. 
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of sales below cost and of a market structure conductive to predation and recoupment’ 
have made it hard for a plaintiff to succeed in US trials.57  
With regard to these facts, public tenders are better protected of such practices 
in the EU than in the USA. First of all, in the test proposed by the CJEU, proof that 
the undertaking concerned had a ‘realistic chance of recouping’ their loss is not 
needed.58 In contrast, besides the need to prove recoupment, the USA system also 
rallies itself with the neoclassical price theory principles when adding the market 
structure test to an already more exigent analysis. 
Furthermore, following this predatory paradigm, attention must be given to 
prior economical mechanisms that can influence such market behavior. For example, 
using profits from one market to compensate losses in another market by undertakings 
active on different fields (e.g. production and supply) can be a good instrument to 
‘dump’ prices.  
Predatory and profit aiming cross subsidization is for sure the most alarming 
for the market. In this case, the main purpose of the company is to ‘drive out’ 
competitors and achieve a monopolistic status. 59 Furthermore, predatory and non-
profit aiming is damaging as well; this kind of practice suits most of the government 
companies as these are presumed to have non-profit purposes.60 In those two cases, 
cross-subsidization involves below-cost pricing and is thus subject to antitrust 
scrutiny61 mostly under the principles of ‘competition on the merits’ and the ‘special 
responsibility of the dominant undertaking’.62 
 However, when it comes to the sole outcome of below cost selling, member 
states policies are divided. The practice is banned and markets are ‘safe’ in Belgium, 
France, Ireland, Spain, and are restricted in other countries including Austria and 
Sweden, whereas it is generally allowed in Netherlands and the UK; also, in the US, 
below cost pricing is illegal when it is done with predatory purpose.63  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 Richard Lindberg, The Ambiguity of Predatory Pricing: Strategy as A Clarifier, seen on Lund 
University’s webpage on 2014.03.14. 
58 Ibid. p. 44. 
59 Kenneth Fjell, A Cross-subsidy Classification Framework (2000) p. 5, seen on The Norwegian 
School of Economics and Business Administration’s webpage on 2014.02.20. 
60 Ibid. p.6 
61 Zhijun Chen, Patrick Rey Competitive Cross-Subsidization, Toulouse School of Economics Working 
Paper, No. 808 (2013), p.3. 
62 Damien Geradin, Anne Layne-Farrar, Nicolas Petit, EU Competition Law and Economics (Oxford, 
Oxford University Press 2012) p. 207. 
63 Ibid. 
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In this resort, cross subsidization strategies are part of the idea of freedom to 
conduct business64 established by the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and in most 
of the times it comes as a legitimate answer to competitive pressure. However, from 
an antitrust point of view, this freedom should bare exceptions when there can be 
proven a predatory intent. 
An economical test developed to identify such practices (i.e. cross subsidizing) 
is the Faulhaber rule; in this matter, public tenders have to set a price at (or above) 
the incremental cost65, prefiguring that they shall make profits;66 also, in multi-
product companies, common costs must be distributed in a ‘equitable way’ as no 
category of consumers is discriminated by paying more.67 
However, as it will be analyzed in the next chapter, certain activities which, as 
a rule, fall within the scope of the public power (Services of General Economic 
Interest, here and after SGEIs), cannot be subject to a criteria of profitability as they 
are not meant to generate profits.68 
On the other hand, it is said that prices are the ‘lingua franca of markets’.69 
From a system perspective, markets fundamentally entail the feedback of information 
in the form of ‘price signals’.70 Embracing this kind of reasoning, scholars belonging 
to the Economic Theory of Regulation develop on ‘signaling, a sub-category of 
predatory pricing’. In their view, an apparently abnormally low tender on a newly 
liberalized market might signal the competitor that they should, in the future, abstain 
from competing for that particular contract or that a certain pricing threshold should 
be respected.71 
Besides the already discussed profit sacrificing element, this theory puts more 
value on the idea of foreclosure as part of the general framework of understanding the 
exclusionary conduct.72  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64  Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union [2000] OJ C 364/1 art. 16: Freedome to 
conduct a business: ‘The Freedom to conduct a business in accordance with Community law and 
national laws and practices is recognized. 
65 Incremental cost is the change that a firm faces when producing one supplementary unit of goods. 
66 Grit Skovgaard Ølykke, op. cit., p.312 
67 Ibid. p. 322. 
68 Christopher H. Bovis , Public Procurement, State Aid and Services of General Economic Interest, 
European Law Journal, Vol. 11, No. 1 (2005) p. 5. 
69 Giuliano Amato, Claus Dieter Ehlermann, op. cit., p. 250. 
70 Hideyuki Mizuta, Ken Steiglitz, Erez Lirov, Effects of price signal choices on market stability, 
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Vol. 52, No. 2, (2003) p. 236.  
71 Grit Skovgaard Ølykke, op. cit. p.115. 
72 COM, DG Competition guidelines on Predatory Pricing, p.2 seen on the International Competition 
Network’s webpage on 2014.02.17. 
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The threat of future predation may constitute a ‘barrier to entry’ for 
prospective competitors; for example entry barriers exist when a new market must 
endure costs that the predator is not bearing, or no longer faces (e.g. the need to hire 
more employees in order to be in compliance with the contract award demands). The 
most frequent example is sunk costs—‘fixed cost investment that cannot be 
withdrawn from the market except at large sacrifice’.73 In this way, signaling can be a 
useful tool in newly liberalized markets where usually the state company still benefits 
from a de facto monopoly (e.g. the main supplier of energy for the biggest part of the 
country’s industry) and thus has the power to foreclose it. 
 There is also the minority part of doctrine considering that ‘the greater the 
profits now being reaped, the greater the incentives’ for potential new entrants.74 
However, this might apply on an oligopoly procurement market (e.g. public works) 
where, there are enough relatively equal players and equilibrium exists even though 
some investment in market access prevention might be happening.75  
Summing up, predatory strategies are clear justifications for abnormally low 
tenders. Even though, on the short run the public authority benefits form a super 
competitive offer, in perspective, competition on the market can be severely distorted. 
In certain cases, predation may be committed to facilitate the perpetration of another 
anticompetitive effect. In this resort, an unsanctioned predation can lead to other 
abuses, this time exploitative; exemplifying, once in a monopolistic position the firm 
can limit production on the given market, apply different conditions to transactions of 
same nature or ‘tie’ the contracting authority.76  
Moreover, as public authorities can opt for a contract (e.g. supply) with one or 
more renewal options (e.g. 3+1+1-year contract),77 the predator can, in this situation, 
by renewing, monopolize that service for a longer period of time with the chance of, 
afterwards, gradually imposing new more favorable conditions by taking into account 
the alleged ‘changes in quantity or value’ which would had occurred in the past (i.e. 
12 months).78 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 Patrick Bolton, Joseph F. Brodley and Michael H. Riordan, Predatory Pricing: Strategic Theory and 
Legal Policy, Georgetown Law Review, Vol. 88, No. 544 (2000)  p. 2273. 
74 Paul P. Craig, Gráinne de Búrca, op. cit, p. 1040. 
75 Dermot Nolan, op. cit., p.4. 
76 Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union [2010] OJ C  83/47, art. 102. 
77 Kristian Hartlev, Morten Wahl Liljenbøl, op. cit., p. 64. 
78 Directive 2004/17/EC, art. 17. 
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2.3 Dumping – stricto sensu  
 
First of all it must be emphasized that, in a wide sense, all of the practices 
presented in this first chapter can be considered to have the effect of dumping 
(lowering) prices. However, in this section the author’s attention shall be focused 
upon what the doctrine understands as classic examples of dumping. 
Starting, the idea of dumping has been mostly defined as ‘price 
discrimination’ between domestic markets.79 
To this point, companies can derive advantages not only form violating the 
negative obligation of abstinence from uncompetitive behavior. Sometimes they also 
neglect the positive obligations that they incubate. For example, certain firms avoid 
paying their taxes, act in breach of worker’s rights, ignore environmental standards or 
try to take advantage of artificially lower priced imported goods. The outcome for 
these situations is that undertakings in question gain an unjust financial advantage that 
they can afterwards use when ‘playing’ on the public procurement market. 
While avoiding paying taxes might be more difficult to disguise, as the rule is 
that contracting authorities require for tax clearance certificates,80 fiscal dumping 
might still occur when member states engage themselves in attracting trade and 
investment unfairly by practices of ‘harmful or predatory, lower taxes’.81 Moreover, 
as far as harmful tax measures are ‘replicated’ in several countries, there is of course 
the danger of a ‘race to the bottom’, which will distort mainly competition and in the 
same time the public procurement market.82  
In this matter, ‘tax havens’ and offshore financial centers give the chance for 
financial engineering. This happens by artificially lowering tax liabilities in higher tax 
administrations by ‘transferring profits to low or zero tax jurisdictions’. 83  For 
example, within the Union, the British Channel Islands are ‘home’ places to many 
financial institutions and undertakings activating in the insurance business due to their 
low taxes.84 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79 Edwin Vermulst, EU Anti-Dumping Law and Practice, 2nd edition, (London, Sweet&Maxwell 2010) 
p. 1. 
80 Public Procurement Guidelines - Competitive Process, p. 10, seen on Environ’s webpage on 
2014.02.19. 
81 Fiscal Dumping seen at Euro Know’s webpage seen on 2014.02.21. 
82 Wolfgang Schön, Tax Competition in Europe, (Amsterdam, IBFD Publications 2003) p. 28. 
83 DG Internal Policies, European Initiatives on eliminating tax havens and offshore financial 
transactions, p.34 seen on the European Parliament’s webpage on 2014.02.20. 
84 The 'who's who' of European tax havens, seen on  Deutsche Welle’s webpage on 2014.02.21. 
	   22	  
A first and administrative way to defend the domestic tax base is by 
implementing ‘counter-measures’ to nullify the effects (e.g. when assessing upon the 
fiscal clearance certificate). Such measures can be ‘the application of tax abuse rules 
or principles85, CFC legislation86, rules on residence and immigration, the denial of 
tax treaty entitlements, the application of transfer pricing rules 87  or the non-
deductibility of certain expenses can be efficient remedies’.88 
Legal harmonization is a second way to deal with the problem. However, this 
area of interest is ‘flooded’ with soft law instruments. For example, the Code of 
Conduct for Business Taxation or the Commission Communication on Preventing and 
Combating Financial and Corporate Malpractice clearly do have political force but 
are non-legally binding instruments.89  
Summing up, lato sensu, fiscal policies remain the attribute of national 
sovereignties; in consequence, the discussion regarding it remains a political one, 
which will mainly be related to the sphere of state measures distorting competition.90  
Seeking the same outcome, companies also engage in social, environmental 
and trade dumping, with the scope of gaining advantage over other market 
participants; while the first two notions involve lowering both, levels of remuneration 
and minimum social demands respectively pollution standards, the third relies on 
lowering the price of imported (from third countries) goods.91 
According to the new Public Procurement Directives, ‘bidders can be 
excluded from the procedure, if they infringed Union or national legislation in the 
field of social, labor or environmental law’. Moreover, contracting authorities will 
reject tenders if they have established that they are abnormally law because of such 
violations.92  
The new Directives promote the use of public procurement exigencies in order 
to enforce social, environmental and labor law standards. This way, the Union 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85 COM(2007)785, Commission communication on the application of anti-abuse measures in the area 
of direct taxation seen on European Commission’s webpage on 2014.02.21. 
86 Controlled foreign corporation law functions in parallel to tax treaties and provides the way how 
taxpayers must declare their foreign earnings. 
87 Transfer pricing is a ‘profit allocation system’ used to impose a multinational companies’ net profit 
or loss to countries where it conducts business. 
88 Wolfgang Schön, op. cit., p. 30. 
89 Corporate and financial malpractice, seen on European Commission’s webpage on 2014.02.25. 
90 Harmful tax competition seen on European Commission’s webpage on 2014.02.23 
91 Magdalena Bernaciak, Social dumping: political catchphrase or threat 
to labor standards?, European Trade Union Institute (Brussels, ETUI Printshop 2012) p. 24. 
92 Directive 2014/24/EU para. 103. 
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legislators makes possible to use procurement ‘for the pursuit of such secondary 
policies’.93 
Analyzing the social issues (most present in the working sector), besides wage 
dumping, companies posting workers or employing migrant labor can gain unfair 
advantages by lowering other employment standards. Good examples are the facts of 
forcing their employees to work longer hours in spite of not giving extra 
compensation, establishing salary deductions for working tools or charging 
abnormally high fees for accommodation or transport to the place of performance 
(especially in the public works area).94 
In consequence, as the degree of ‘deliberate harmonization in the Union 
legislation aims at combating these specific distortions’ that can injure particular areas 
of the economy, 95 the Union bodies enacted the Posted Workers Directive. 
The result is a ‘floor of rights’ that puts the posted workers on the same level 
of protection with the one enjoyed by the worker in the host Member State.96 The 
Directive requires Member States to ensure that posted workers are subject to the host 
country's laws concerning most importantly ‘maximum work periods and minimum 
rest periods, minimum rates of pay, including overtime rates, health, safety and 
hygiene at work or minimum paid annual holidays’.97  
However, as in the Laval case, for countries like Sweden, where the minimum 
wages in the construction field are usually established after collective negotiations on 
a case-by-case context, the CJEU considered that a salary rate constructed in this way 
couldn’t be instituted under Directive 96/71/EC.98 Following the legislation, the 
Directive on third-country seasonal workers states that this category of individuals 
has the above mentioned rights as well.99Also, the new Posted Workers Proposed 
Directive provides with compliance monitoring instruments in the matter of national 
control measures (e.g. inspections), including those that may be applied third-country 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93 Albert Sánchez Graells, Exclusion, Qualitative Selection and Short-listing in the New Public Sector 
Procurement Directive, (2013) p. 4 seen on SSRN’s webpage on 2014.03.20. 
94 Magdalena Bernaciak, op. cit. p.26. 
95 Paul Davies, Antonie Lyon-Caen, Silvana Sciarra and Spiros Simitis, European Community Labor 
Law: Principles and Perspectives, (Oxford, Clarendon Press 1996) p. 79. 
96 Philippa Watson, EU Social and Employment Law, (Oxford, Oxford University press 2009) p. 336. 
97 Directive 96/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning the posting of workers 
in the framework of the provision of services, [2006] OJ L 018, art. 3. 
98 CJEU Case C-341/05, Laval un Partneri Ltd v Svenska, [2007] ECR I-11767, para. 63. 
99 Council adopts directive on third-country seasonal workers, seen on European Union’s webpage 
seen on 2014.02.27. 
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nationals who are posted within the EU.100 Also, there exist a double protection 
regarding the possible dumping from this category of workers as, while being present 
on the Union territory they must also detain visas and permits.101 
Considering other possible abuses, the new procurement legislation also 
allows for exclusion in case of practices related to ‘child labor and other forms of 
trafficking in human beings’ that injures both, the economic environment and social 
ethics.102  
It shall however be seen if all this regulatory framework will have a clear 
administrative transposition and assure compliance from all of the employers; in the 
author’s view, the big problem is represented by the weak enforcement of the rules as, 
most of the times, even though in breach of national/Union law, such contractual 
relationships are seen as ‘win-win’ situations by the two parties. 
Going further, firms facing stricter environmental norms are bearing much 
higher costs.103 In order to lower their expenses and have a financial advantage, some 
undertakings disregard such quality levels. 
Dumping can exist in this area as well; for example, environmental dumping is 
the use of cross border shipment of residual materials from one sovereignty to another 
with the aim of taking the waste to a country that has not as severe environmental 
laws or where such laws are not properly enforced.104  
As a remedy for such practice, Regulation 1013/2006 (Basel Regulation) 
serves to implement not only the EU’s own objective in the waste sector, but also 
most of its international law obligations. For example specific waste treatment that 
takes place in low-cost installations and which does not apply the ‘best valuable 
techniques’ can attract sanctions in the public procurement procedures.105 It looks that 
the ‘polluter pays principle’ extends and we are facing a double punishment, one 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
100  COM(2012) 131 final Proposal for a Directive on the enforcement of Directive 96/71/EC 
concerning the posting of workers in the framework of the provision of services, para. 23. 
101 Directive 2011/98/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council on a single application 
procedure for a single permit for third-country nationals to reside and work in the territory of a Member 
State and on a common set of rights for third-country workers legally residing in a Member State 
[2012] OJ L 343/1, art. 12. 
102 Directive 2014/24/EU, art. 57. 
103 Hans Veder, Competition Law and Environmental Protection in Europe; Towards Sustainability?, 
(Amsterdam, European Law Publishing 2003) p. 46. 
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resulting from the Regulation (i.e. severe fines) and one from the Proposed Public 
Procurement Directive (i.e. exclusion from the procedures).106 
When considering imported goods, the current thinking in international trade 
provides that it is unfair that a manufacturer who takes advantage from ‘protectionist’ 
behavior in his domestic market, and therefore can ask for high prices there, 
subsequently uses such ‘monopoly profits’ in order to subsidize exports at lower 
prices. 107 
With regard to this fact, chances to influence public procurement are lower. 
The EU deals with such issues trough Regulation 597/2009 on protection against 
subsidized imports from countries not members of the EU (e.g. products originating 
from subsidized industries), Regulation 1225/2009 on protection against dumped 
imports from countries not members of the European Community (e.g. products from 
non-market economy countries) and Regulation 260/2009 on the common rules for 
imports.108 As it can be seen, in contrast with, for example, fiscal dumping, the EU 
has a solid mechanism of protecting its market and implicitly the public procurement 
field from such practices that can hinder competition.  
In this resort, the Union can impose anti-dumping duties, which levels should 
be either equal with the margin of dumping or subsidy or with the level of injury 
supported by the Union industry;109 also, the same countervailing remedy is provided 
for subsidized imported goods.110   
Drawing an analogy with the sphere of Union competences it can be seen that, 
where it has exclusive (e.g. customs union, common commercial policy)111 or shared 
competences (e.g. environment, social policy for the Treaty aspects)112 the anti-
dumping protection is considerably higher than areas where the Union lacks 
substantive prerogatives (e.g. fiscal area).  
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2.4 Seeking renegotiations – ‘hold-ups’ and the subsequent conditional 
performance 
 
Hold-up problems take place where the bidder is in the posture to force the 
contracting public authority to renegotiate the agreement by using the intimidation of 
not fulfilling the contract else ways. 113 Another example, which verifies, as in the 
case predatory strategies, the abuse of dominance criteria is the one in which the 
supplier can ‘hold up’ the public authority if the later does not have the option of 
receiving the goods or services in question from another firm (e.g. cases of exclusive 
distributorship). In such scenario the supplier is in the situation to demand excessive 
prices based on the initiation of the hold up.114 
With regard to this fact, when a tendered price is apparently low, the doctrine 
considers that a ‘undesired risk of opportunistic hold-up’ arises; in this case, the 
tenderer is able to force a renegotiation at the threat of not diligently achieving his 
contractual obligations. 115  
For example, public procurement contracts awarded via competitive tendering 
are most of the time being renegotiated. This fact generates important post contractual 
costs and questions the effectiveness of the hall proceedings; in a study of public 
works procurement contracts in Italy, it was established that, for about a quarter of all 
works, ‘adaptation costs consecutive to renegotiations’ raised the first price by 
10%.116 
On the other hand, procurement directives contain no expressis verbis 
statement governing existing contracts, which could give the impression that the 
procurement rules do not apply to them.117 
However, it should be noted that the rules on public procurement do not allow 
for limitless renegotiation after the contract has been awarded.118 The key concept on 
which the supranational legislator emphasizes is the fact that the ‘original terms of the 
contract must not be substantially altered.’119 
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From a broad perspective, ‘substantial alteration’ is a legal term that defines a 
change that may ‘violate a specific principle of community law, especially the 
principles of free and undistorted competition, of equality of treatment of the 
tenderers, and above all the principle of ensuring the effectiveness of the Union 
Directives’.120  
Where there has been substantial cost growth during the execution phase of a 
public contract, it is often proof that the ‘contractor bought its way into the contract’ 
by intentionally transmitting a bid below his anticipated cost of performance.121 For 
example, bearing in mind the abovementioned 10% threshold, in the CJEU’s view is 
that, by agreeing an increase of the original tender price of up to 10% in connection to 
the earlier procedures, the piece of legislation implementing the European laws into 
the Spanish legal system were in breach of the two public procurement Directives, 
since they allowed a ‘substantial alteration of one of the original conditions of the 
contract, namely the price’.122 
On the other hand, leaving a wider margin for post contract reviews, the new 
procurement provisions state that the renegotiation frameworks can be ‘10 % of the 
initial contract value for service and supply contracts and below 15 % of the initial 
contract value for works contracts’.123  
However, in completion, the CJEU does not resume its reasoning only at the 
price criterion. In the Nachricthenagentur case the Court delivered a test to assess if a 
change is material. It stated that ‘if there will be conditions introduced which, had 
they been part of the initial award procedure, would have allowed for the admission of 
tenderers other than those initially admitted or accepted’, 124  the conditions for 
materiality are met. 
 Furthermore, if the scope of the contract prolongs its effects to cover services 
that were not previously covered (e.g. from renovation of a section to renovation of 
the whole building) or if the economic structure of the agreement is revised in favor 
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of the supplier in a way which was not provided for in the conditions of the first 
awarding documents the same outcome is reached.125 
The materiality test is especially useful in the light of the new proposed 
directive due to the fact that it is very suitable with the MEAT criteria, which, as 
already stated, is being placed at the forefront of the award criteria. 
In consequence, the ‘sanction’ for any substantial modification relating to the 
actual subject matter of the contract must be considered equivalent to the completion 
of a new contract that also requires new competition.126  
For example, changes to the technical specifications, the execution timetable 
(e.g. deadlines), the conditions for acceptance of the deliverables or the construction 
techniques, are to be seen as substantial or material alterations to those terms.127 
In order to bypass such complications, the rejection on grounds of risk of non-
performance becomes the primarily reason for which abnormally low tenders are 
being disregarded.128 In this sense, according to the case law, a contracting authority 
can use ‘predetermined calculation methods for classifying tenderers as abnormally 
low’129 but, as mentioned before, must allow the defendant to present his arguments.   
In this matter, the ability to perform the contract must however be assessed in 
a wide sense, covering, at a first sight, all the tenderer’s ‘activities, obligations 
liabilities, general financial situations’130 and of course, as mentioned above, where 
the national legislation permits, the overriding reasons.  
For example, it is for sure that a tenderer in a critical economic situation will 
tender more ‘aggressively’ because he has little to loose due to limited liability in the 
event that it goes bankrupt as a result of the irresponsible bids.131 
On the other hand, the new Directives create another optional exclusion 
ground that is based on poor previous performance by the bidder, which is meant to 
punish operators that have abused by such practices in the past.132 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
125 Ibid. para.36-37. 
126 COM(2004)327 final Green Paper on Public-Private Partnership and Community Law on Public  
Contracts and Concessions p.16 seen on European Commission’s webpage on 2014.03.03. 
127 Guide to the Community Rules on Public Works Contracts, seen on European Commission’s 
webpage on 2014.03.03. 
128 Grit Skovgaard Ølykke, op. cit p. 119. 
129 Sune Troels Poulsen, Peter Stig Jakobsen, Simon Evers Kalsmose-Hjelmborg, EU Public 
Procurement Law, (Copenhagen, DJØF Publishing 2012) p.507. 
130 Grit Skovgaard Ølykke, op. cit., p. 232. 
131 Ibid. p. 117. 
132 Albert Sánchez Graells, Exclusion, Qualitative Selection and Short-listing in the New Public Sector 
Procurement Directive, p. 10. 
	   29	  
In the same time, the hold-up problem is an important element of the 
‘incomplete contracting approach’, which has become a ‘leading paradigm’ in 
institutional and organizational economics.133 In contrast with jurists, whom perceive 
hold-ups as pure effects of bi/multilateral contracts, economists develop a more 
holistic and dynamic view by trying to answer to this issue while placing it in 
interconnection with the entire market structure and behavior.  
From economists’ perspective, financial renegotiations and the associated 
hold-up problems may be most probably taking place in longer term projects as, 
public-private partnerships, when project cost, market demand or other market 
conditions get ‘significantly unfavorable’ and cause the promoter to renegotiate with 
the government and ask for rescue (e.g. subsidies). 134 As it can be seen their approach 
is closer to the law theory of un-foreseeability and does not necessary share the 
jurists’ preoccupation for deceptive intent and potential unfair gain.  
Deeping the analysis, another and frequently neglected consequence of the 
parties reviewing existing contracts is the fact that such changes may imply illegal 
State aid. 135  In this sense, the procurement Directives provide that ‘where a 
contracting entity establishes that a tender is abnormally low because the tenderer has 
obtained State aid, the tender can be rejected’.136As it will be seen in the following 
chapter of the thesis, this is drastically sanctioned and can lead to further lose for the 
company in question. 
 
Chapter ll: State aid 
3.1 Defining the concept 
 
State aid has been defined as ‘assumption by the state of costs which normally 
fall on undertakings’ or the acceptance by the state of part of the risk which is 
normally supported by firms and for which the state is not responsible;137 as stated in 
the Bretagne Angleterre Irlande case, the CJEU emphasized that State aid rules are to 	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also be applicable to agreements for consideration, established between the 
government having the role of purchaser and a seller (i.e. private or public firm).138 
In this resort, in order to be considered as State aid, and in order to fall within 
the general prohibition and to need prior authorization, four cumulative elements have 
to be met; the measure must be granted out of State capacities which confer an 
selective economic advantage to the companies, fact that might affect intra-Union 
trade.139 
In the same time, State aid is perceived as a ‘political instrument’ for Member 
States’ government, who intervene in their countries’ economies with the purpose of 
helping their own enterprises. This, is however done at the detriment of competitors 
located in other Member States that, in the context of public tenders, find themselves 
in a disadvantageous situation. 140  The political nature of State aid is further 
strengthened by the fact that this instrument may also be used for non-economic 
purposes, like, for example, the protection of national strategic interests.141 
Having this as a premise, in a recent communication, the European 
Commission (here and after, the Commission) emphasized that State aid control aims 
at ensuring that the internal market is not distorted by uncompetitive behavior of 
Member States favoring some particular economical actors.142 In the absence of such 
control, the EU would be transformed in the ‘wrestle arena of the Member States’ 
ministries of finance’, fact that would also have a severe impact on the procurement 
or privatization markets.143 
Nowadays State aid control has been divided into different sections. The 
assessment is being carried on both: ‘horizontal’ (e.g. environmental, R&D) and 
‘vertical’ (e.g. sectorial) aid.144 
Considering the selective advantage criteria, in Belgium v Commission, the 
CJEU stated that a measure allowing the creation of working places by decreasing the 	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social contributions (in some sectors of activity) was to be interpreted as State aid;145 
neither the high total of benefiting firms nor the variety of the areas concerned did not 
leave to the conclusion that the measure was of general applicability.146  
As it can be seen from this example, form other CJEU decisions147 and 
considering the dominant opinion unanimously embraced by the doctrine, the concept 
of aid covers the granting of an ‘advantage in the broadest sense of the term, in any 
form whatsoever’ and therefore a broader area than the concept of subsidy.148 In this 
matter, tax exemptions, exclusions from para-fiscal charges, preferential interest rates, 
favorable loan guarantees, the provision of land or buildings on special terms, 
indemnities of fiscal or social contributions and dividend guarantees or any other 
advantage can constitute State aid. 149  In a nutshell, State aid is a measure 
‘simultaneously entailing benefits for undertakings and burdens for the state’.150 
Exemplifying further, governmental help might be delivered just as much 
through the administrative methods of the tax authorities whenever a selective 
advantage can be upheld (e.g. discretional tax collection).151  
The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (here and 
after, OECD) illustrates some of the types of aid that Member States can use in their 
industrial policies. In their report, elements like ‘government procurements, 
exemptions from antitrust laws, regulatory barriers to competition, access to credit, 
arranged mergers and acquisitions, control of acquisitions of national companies by 
foreign investors, easy access to commodity resources and the products of monopolist 
companies’ are considered to be incentives equivalent to State aid that can influence 
final prices.152 
Going further, when it comes to State aid law as part of Competition Law, the 
doctrine stated that, in order to distort the competitive environment, it is enough that a 
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measure somehow rises the market status of the beneficiary by decreasing his 
expenses.153 
As it can be interfered, free undistorted competition requires that not only 
private anti-competitive behavior is banned, but also state intervention in the market 
must be subject to an effective control mechanism.154  
The general rule state by the CJEU in Arge case was that ‘contracting 
authority allowing bodies receiving subsidies, which enable them to submit lower 
offers than those of the other, does not constitute covert discrimination’;155moreover, 
this cannot justify the exclusion of entities from a public tendering procedure a priori 
and without further consideration.156 
On the other hand, the exception from this wide principle is found in the 
Procurement Directives which provide that a tender may be rejected where a public 
authority considers that a tender is abnormally low because the tenderer has received 
(or misused) State aid. However, the tender can be excluded only if he is unable to 
show that the aid in question was received legally.157 
Furthermore, the procedure provides that the Commission must be informed in 
case of such rejection158 as it has the exclusive authority to rule on the compatibility 
or incompatibility of State aid with the single market.159 
To this extent, as the General Court (here and after, the GC) has clarified, the 
burden of proving that all or parts of the authorized State aid is illegal or has been 
misused by the beneficiary rests with the Commission.160 In this matter, ever since the 
Sate Aid Action Plan (2005), the Commission carries out more seriously through 
economic elements of State Aid (i.e. dynamic approach) and does not resume its 
analysis to formal assessments.161  
On the other hand, giving primacy to this economic path, the doctrine 
proposes an exception; where the unlawfully granted or misused State aid has zero 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
153 Kelyn Bacon, op. cit.,  p. 9. 
154 Michael Sánchez Rydelski, The EC State Aid Regime: Distortive Effects of State Aid on Competition 
and Trade, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 2006) p.11. 
155 CJEU, Case C-94/99 ARGE Gewässerschutz v Bundesministerium für Land [2000] ECR I-11037, 
para. 38. 
156 CJEU, Case C-305/08, Consorzio Nazionale Interuniversitario per le Scienze del Mare (CoNISMa) 
v Regione Marche, [2009] ECR I-12129 para 34. 
157 Directive 2004/18/EC, article 57. 
158 Ibid. 
159 Martin Heidenhain, op. cit. 15-16.  
160 Ibid. p. 669. 
161 Leigh Hancher, Tom Ottervanger, op. cit., p. 30. 
	   33	  
effects on the goods’ full costs and no consistent link with the strangely low bid 
submitted is proven, the tender should still be accepted.162 However, even though 
agreeing with this view that the public procurement rules should not sanction such 
behavior, the State aid remedies must still be enforced as the aid in question might 
distort other segments of the market. 
Summing up, as it can be seen, in many of the situations there is a double 
punishment, one imposed by the public authority that consists in the rejection from 
the tenderer and one that will be decided by the Commission and will most probably 
seek at the recovery of the illegal State aid. In the next sections I shall develop on 
points in which State aid and public procurement interact and have the potential of 
distorting contractual considerations.  
 
3.2 Misused aid  
 
The more complicated problem in this area appears when legally granted State 
aid is being misused; citing Article 1 of the Procedural Regulation, ‘misuse of aid’ 
means ‘aid put into effect in contravention of Article 107(3) TFEU’; article 108(2) 
TFEU states that proceeding are applicable in all case typologies: ‘notified, unlawful, 
existing or misuse of aid’. Furthermore, article 20(2) of the Procedural Regulation 
provides that ‘any interested party may inform the Commission of any alleged 
unlawful aid and any alleged misuse of aid’.163 
Usually, misused aid involves action by the beneficiary rather than the 
Member State and comes into action when aid is used by the receiver in breach of the 
European Commission’s imposed conditions.164 
However, the wording ‘granted legally’ must not be confused with the idea of 
‘legal state aid’165 as the last relates to the assessed compatibility of the aid with the 
internal market – analysis carried by the Commission after prior notification, the 
former will not encompass a substantive financial test and will just be a ‘bureaucratic’ 
phase carried by the awarding authority. 
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As it can be deduced, this will not be a suitability analysis but rather one in 
which the contracting authority will look to see if the aid was notified and approved 
by the Commission or weather it falls within the scope of a block exemption 
provision. 
It can be interfered that the ‘monopolistic’ competence of the European 
Commission when applying the relevant legislation maintains the analysis that public 
bodies can use to abnormally low tenders tainted by State aid ‘limited to the legality 
of its being granted and not of its use’.166 Moreover, the wording in the new 
legislation: ‘compatible with the internal market within the meaning of Article 107 
TFEU’ comes to strengthen even more this type of logic.167 
Going further, like the case of predatory pricing, the misuse of State aid can 
take the form of internal cross-subsidization and, as a consequence of this practice, it 
can unbalance the market by delivering artificially low prices. 
For example, as already stated in the First Chapter, a price scheme is said to 
have cross subsidies if earnings from a client are lower than the incremental cost of 
providing services in return or if ‘some consumer prices are below average costs168 
and others are above’.169 
The CJEU, in SFEI v La Poste case, ruled that the provision of logistical and 
commercial assistance by a public entity to its subsidiaries, which are regulated by 
private law and carry on an activity opened to free competition, can be seen as State 
aid if the remuneration received is lower than the one which would have been claimed 
under regular market circumstances.170 
Trough analogy, the same problem arises when a private undertaking uses 
legally allocated State aid in other sectors of its activity than the one for which the aid 
was awarded. The effect is as harmful and the only difference is the legal qualification 
that, in this example, is misused and not illegal aid.  
The substantive test in this case coincides with the one that can be used in the 
case of predatory subsidization. As already mentioned in the last chapter, the 
Faulhaber test comes as a useful tool in combating such practices. 	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Exemplifying, in a case regarding the anthracite market (good used in 
electricity, iron and steel industry public procurement and also domestic use), under a 
law regulating coal used in the electricity industry, two German companies received 
subsidies from their domestic government.171 
The Commission stated that the separation made by the Member State 
between subsidized and non-subsidized production on the basis of the product market 
was to be considered ‘artificial and unfounded’. This was because, both the domestic 
and industrial market were receiving the aid-supported products. Furthermore, the 
Union judicature assessed the State aid received helped pricing policies which did not 
justify production costs. Concluding, the Brussels technocrats emphasized on the fact 
that, ex nunc, goods intended for industrial and domestic usage will have to be 
commercialized at prices fitting the production expenses.172 
To this extent, the Commission was and will be able to take a decision 
ordering the Member State to suspend the aid until it assesses upon its compatibility 
with the internal market; where it finds out that the aid has been misused it demands 
for its recovery.173 Moreover, after the recently recast of the Procedural Regulation, 
the Commission has powers to request data from sources other than Member States 
(e.g. beneficiaries) and is also attributed with the coercion mechanism of imposing 
fines in case of lack of compliance.174 Moreover, the cooperation with the National 
Competition Authorities (here and after, NCAs) is another tool that the Commission 
can use in order to relieve itself from administrative matters.  
In this sense, a NCA receives information and documents from beneficiaries 
of State aid, draws up their inventory, informs the Government on issues identified 
proposes remedies and, when the case, sends answers, explanations, documents and 
any other information requested by the Community procedures.175 
Summing up, national awarding authorities have no prerogatives when it 
comes to the substantive assessment on either misused or illegal State aid; they need 
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to stick to a rigid formal analysis and, in situations of doubt, can receive help from 
competent authorities (primarily, the Commission and the NCAs). 
As it will be seen in the next chapter, besides the Faulhaber test (typical for 
misused aid and predatory pricing), practitioners have also developed substantive 
‘filters’ in order to detect illegal state aid. Furthermore, the tests fit on both situations, 
when State aid is received through public tenders (e.g. privatization, establishment of 
Services of General Economic Interest, here and after, SGEIs) and also, when 
government incentives can distort competition and efficient public procurement (e.g. 
capital ‘injections’, non-diligent debt management).  
All this preoccupation comes as a legit remedy mechanism due to the fact that 
once ‘injected’, public aid can have major implication when it comes to competition 
on the market and as a consequence, on the final contractual price. 
 
3.3 Illegal State Aid 
 
Article 107 TFEU provides that public aid granted ‘in any form whatsoever’ 
‘which distorts or threatens to distort competition’ on the internal market by giving an 
advantage to certain companies shall be treated as illegal.176 To this extent, favoring 
the production of certain goods that afterwards are to be sold in public tenders can be 
seen as distorting competition.  
According to a working framework developed by Directorate General for 
Competition (here and after DG Competition), central in the State aid assessment is 
the principle of the ‘Market Economy Operator Principle’. In this matter, the main 
idea is to compare the state’s behavior with that of a comparable private player whom 
finds itself in the same situation and acts under normal market conditions. Depending 
on the context, the principle can have three variations: the ‘Market Economy Investor 
Principle’ (here and after, MEIP) – which is based on the idea of profit, the ‘Market 
Economy Creditor Principle’ – fundamental on the idea of repayment and the ‘Market 
Economy Vendor Principle’ – constructed on the aim of receiving the highest price.177  
Based on these principles, the Union Courts and Commission have developed tests 
that are used when assessing on public aid. 	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3.3.1 Market Economy Investor Principle 
 
The Union judicature makes use of the Market Economy Investor Principle 
when it assesses on the capital investment that a Public body makes in private or 
public undertaking. The conclusion will be that there exists State aid if the investment 
(i.e. direct or indirect) would not be suitable from the point of view of a diligent 
private investor whom finds himself in a similar business context.178  
The policy making character of the MEIP is to make sure that there will not be 
intervention on the market that would otherwise help underperforming undertakings at 
the cost of keeping artificial prices on the market. In the same time, this particular 
‘filter’ is a consistent principle that needs to be respected. It is based on the idea that 
the Union legislation does not aim at discriminatory treatment between public and 
private ownership.179 
However, even though embracing such logic, there are consistent elements 
that separate private from public undertakings. Figures like position on the market, 
structure, demand criteria, the way of understanding efficiency, supply conditions, the 
manufacturing procedures, pricing policies and the risk management can be perceived 
in fundamental different ways in the two sectors.180 
Having regard to such particularities, it has been argued that allowing national 
bodies to use their powers as public authorities for the interest of their investments in 
undertakings operating in markets that are under Competition law scrutiny would 
injure the Union rules in State aid and make them powerless.181  
In this resort, the doctrine has concluded that, in applying this test, the state 
must be perceived as owner (i.e. concentrating on the value of the assets) and not as 
public authority (e.g. seeking short run results for the upcoming elections).182 
Exemplifying, when a company receives ‘fresh capital’ under circumstances 
that would not have been viable for a private investor operating ‘under normal market 
economy conditions’, a firm belief of State aid occurs.183 
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The Private Investor Test represents the central method of assessment in this 
resort. Moreover, the key element on which the test is based is the ‘appropriate rate of 
return’ - seen as reasonable profit - that stays as a barometer for evaluating the 
different transactions taking place on the market.184  
The CJEU concluded that it is essential to provide with evidence showing that 
the aid is given on the basis of economic calculations similar to the ones which a 
‘rational private investor’ in a comparable context would have engaged in; 185 
moreover, the profitability assessment must be done before (and not after) proceeding 
to the actual investment.186  
More precise, the realized investment will be perceived as State aid if the 
financial return that the public body receives (e.g. from rent, operating taxes, 
publicity) is lower than what a private investor would have expected in an analogous 
context.187 In the same time, by taking into consideration their specificities, the test 
developed in particular features for each and every industry (e.g. airlines, cars).188 
When considering the nature of the incentives, this ‘filter’ can also be used 
where the state is using measures that are not in the private investor’s portfolio (e.g. 
fiscal), if they have the objective of stimulating an economic activity.189   
For example, in the EDF case, it did not matter for the Union judiciary that the 
incentives delivered were ‘instruments of state power’ (i.e. tax nature - deductions) 
and concluded that the public body in question offered that discriminatory advantage 
in his posture of shareholder of the company it owned;190 this way, the Court widened 
the area for this test in order to secure and undistorted competitive environment. 
A variation of the MEIP test, with regard to the capital market is being 
developed by the CJEU in Belgium v Commission with the aim to determine whether 
the decision of a government (shareholder) to ‘inject’ capital, in a company facing 
financial problems incubates State aid; the essential criterion to determine this fact 	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was whether the company had the chance (i.e. was ‘desirable’ enough) to receive the 
same amount on the capital market.191 This test is constructed on the idea of efficient 
State aid and aims to make sure that the national government acts in a proportionate 
way (as a regular shareholder) and does not confer incentives that a private associate 
would not have invested.  
Other extensions of this principle can be transposed in areas like loans (i.e. ‘a 
loan does not involve state aid if it is approved under the same conditions that a 
commercial lender would accept’) or guarantees (‘guarantees are not perceived as 
State aid if they are adequately remunerated’).192  
Slightly moving to the liberalization process, when analyzing restructuring 
aid’s role in the privatization procedures, the Commission had the chance to deliver 
its opinion in three major cases related to the automobile industry (i.e. ENASA, 
Renault and Rover). In these situations aid in the form of ‘capital injection, debt relief 
and loss compensation’ was delivered in order to prepare the non-competitive 
undertakings for privatization. However, the measures were validated only in part by 
the Commission and resumed only to the restructuring plan priorities (i.e. the closure 
of capacities) while excluding any other excessive, above market rates, support.193 
The overcompensation was perceived as unnecessary incentive under the MEIP; 
moreover the sole aim was to make the undertakings competitive enough for 
privatization and not to give a substantive advantage to the further buyer of the asset. 
Concluding, nowadays, in its recent casuistic, the CJEU has made a transition 
from a criteria based on the ‘normal investor’ (i.e. aiming at short term profit) to one 
based on a ‘reasonable investor’ (i.e. aiming at longer term profitability) and who also 
‘pursues goals derived from broader economic policy with his investments’.194 In this 
way, the analysis became less rigid and more dynamic when assessing on the current 
economic realities.  
However, the idea of ‘broader economical policy’ should be limited within the 
frames of the private sector dimension definitions. If this way of reasoning extends as 
well to the public sector, economical policy may incubate strategic or social aspects 
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(e.g. development of a region, electoral matters) that, at the end of the day, would 
allow the State to behave as public authority and not just as private investor. 
3.3.2 Market Economy Vendor Principle  
 
As it has been mentioned before, the Market Economy Vendor Principle has 
as core the idea of obtaining maximum price from transactions. As it will be seen in 
this section, the price is sometimes unbalanced as the state gives primacy to a public 
authority way of reasoning instead of embracing a normal market conduct.  
Furthermore, when it comes to the actual privatization, scholars have 
developed what is called to be the Public Vendor Test. The main question that needs 
to be answered is ‘did the state act in the same way as a private vendor would act in 
order to get the highest price?.195 
 In connection with privatization and public procurement procedures, deriving 
from applied economics, practitioners have developed the Auction theory.196  Linking 
it with the already discussed game theory, it can be said that auctions are ‘bayesian197 
games’; also, in connection with the contract design theory, auctions are seen as 
‘allocation mechanisms’ that afterwards become models of price information.198 Even 
though auctions per se aim at assuring the best price, Member States can sometimes 
‘sabotage’ this objective by implementing specific protectionist demands in the tender 
documentation.  
 Even though prima facie it may look that Member States chose to privatize 
state companies for policy based reasons, in most of the situations liberalization 
occurs as the undertakings in question become strong financial burdens that the 
national governments can no longer sustain.199  
In the Bank Burgenland case, by following a public tender procedure, the 
undertaking was sold to a company offering about 30% less than the other competitor. 
The Commission took the view that, in such a case, a public vendor needs to disregard 
its status function of public authority who had granted (conditional on privatization) 
State aid in the form of a guarantee to Bank Burgenland and adopt a behavior closer 	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to the one of a ‘seller of an asset on an open market’; it concluded that a private seller 
would have preferred a higher price instead of ‘assuring’ the existing guarantee 
liabilities.200 
Moreover, in a Competition Policy Report, the Brussels technocrats 
considered that there is a presumption of respect of normal market conditions and of 
conformity with the State aid rules when the privatization is realized by the sale of 
shares on the stock market.201 
However, if the undertaking is being privatized by regular trade sale, the 
presumption is not effective anymore; Commission guidelines provide with the need 
to sell the company to the highest bidder and to assure a competitive tender which is 
‘not conditional on the performance of other acts such as the acquisition of assets 
other than those bid for or the continued operation of certain business’.202  
For example, in the Automobile Craiova case, the Commission assessed that 
the privatization conditions encompassed certain demands with direct effect on 
minimum production, employment and investment levels. To that extent, the scoring 
grid revealed that the price offered meant just 35 % of the total score; the rest was 
composed by the aggregate investments (i.e. 25 %), the achievement of a production 
integration level of 60% after four years (i.e. 20 %) and the obligation achieve a 
production level of 200000 during the fifth year (i.e. 20 %).203 As a result, the 
Commission decided that the indirect reduction in the final sales price (amounting at 
about approximate 70 %) conferred an advantage on the privatized economic entity 
and was to be seen as State aid.204  
Departing from the privatization discussion, practitioners have also developed 
a test for the regular trade agreements as well. In this matter, the Private Purchaser 
Test has the purpose of assessing if the contract represents a ‘regular trade 
agreement’.205 
In the case in which a public body purchases goods and services when it does 
not have ‘an actual need for them’, the Union judicature has concluded that this is not 	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a normal market transaction and involves state aid.206 This was the situation in joined 
cases P & O European Ferries where the purchase (by a public body) of a 
predetermined number of travel vouchers that were more expensive than the normal 
commercial estimate and that were paid for even in respect of journeys which were 
not made.207 
As it can be deduced from the two, Private Vendor and Purchaser, tests, they 
are mostly based on the idea of financial efficiency. However, it must be emphasized 
that like in the case of public procurement, privatization can also take into 
consideration non-economic criteria. For example, environmental policies can be 
implemented during the privatization procedures. To this extent, considering a lower 
bid in the detriment of a non-ecological option looks a legitimate exception208 due to 
the fact that environmental policies are a growing Union interest.209 
 
3.3.3 Market Economy Creditor Principle 
 
A private creditor is to be perceived as a public entity to which, even before 
facing financial issues, the company having problems was owing money. This type of 
claim is usually the result of repetitive and consolidated non-payment of taxes or 
social security contributions.210  
Exemplifying, in Spain v Commission, a case regarding indirect taxation, the 
CJEU had stated that the fact of ‘constant non-payment of taxes and social security 
contributions’ of the undertaking in question followed by the lack of diligence from 
the State in recovering at least a small amount, was to be considered an attitude 
contrary to what a private creditor would usually do. 211 
In Tubacex case the CJEU had been demanded and answer regarding the 
interest rates that must be charged by a public creditor who re-scheduled debts; 
starting from the premises that the interest’s purpose is to make good the loss, the 	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Court stated that ‘if the rate of default interest applied to the debts of a public creditor 
is not the same as the rates charged for the debts owed to a private creditor, it is the 
latter rate which ought to be charged if it is higher than the former’.212 
In the matter of direct taxation, the Union judicature established that the 
failure to pay VAT was not enough to raise a presumption that a company has 
enjoyed an advantage within the meaning of State aid rules. It completed its reasoning 
by stating that is the Commission’s responsibility to search whether that lack of 
payment provides with a cash-flow gain on the undertaking in question (e.g. moving 
the money inside a public auction).213 
Drawing connection with the already discussed privatization process, a 
company’s debt resulting, this time, from indirect taxes, may be ‘written off or 
reduced’ before privatization as far as the ‘income is above the reduction in debt’. 
This was the case in Germany v Commission, where, in order to analyze whether 
capital contribution related to the sale of a public company raised problems of State 
aid, the CJEU considered that it was necessary to assess whether ‘a market economy 
investor’ would have decided to ‘wide up the firm’ instead of ‘injecting’ additional 
capital.214 
Continuing with the reasoning, this principle also finds its applicability where 
a creditor would seek to secure a payment in the case scenario according to which the 
debtor finds himself in severe financial difficulties. 215 In this resort, a public creditor 
might also be tempted to accept a financial restructuring plan of the firm ‘if it 
promises a better return than liquidation’.216 This was the case in PZL Hydral case 
where a settlement regarding the historical debts by State creditors was preferred to 
bankruptcy.217 
Developing on this kind of practice, in the Vitesse case, Commission 
appreciated that the municipality acted like a hypothetic private creditor within the 
options that the Dutch law provided with. In this case, the soccer club was, at its 
request, allowed to suspend payments with the scope of restructuring the balance 
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sheet and be able to pay its creditors afterwards.218 Supporting the club’s financial 
recovery and defending its own financial interest, the municipality of Arnhem, acting 
in accordance with the market economy creditor principle, agreed with a settlement 
regarding damages resulting from a penalty clause in order to avoid a situation of 
bankruptcy for the debtor; in this resort, it hoped for a gradually recoupment ex 
nunc.219 
In the matter of recovery of investment previously made it can be observed 
that the creditor’s initial priority focuses less on the complete return and more on the 
‘increase of the possibility of recovering’ the values he has already provided with.220 
Concluding, the CJEU has decided that the Commission's use of the private 
creditor and investor tests ‘involves complex economic appraisals’. Having this as a 
premise, it established that when facing such cases, the European Courts must 
‘resume their analysis to see if the Commission respected the formal procedural rules 
and if there appeared ‘any manifest error of assessment or a misuse of powers’.221  
The sole outcome of such a judicial policy is that the Commission is basically the 
only one to decide on substantive aid matters while the Courts are more or less 
dealing with formal issues which do not allow them to develop a real intimate 
assessment. 
 
3.3.4 The framework for financing SGEIs 
 
In a standard definition, the Commission sees SGEIs to be activities that are 
economical in nature and to which public authorities give high importance by 
considering them of fundamental social need (e.g. postal services, transportation).222 
The fact that there is not enough or not at all offer for such services makes the state 
intervene and become itself, direct on indirect, a provider.223 
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In this matter, their activity cannot be equated to the main characteristics of 
private sector entrepreneurship due to the fact that the purpose of the public sector is 
‘not to maximize gains but to assure satisfying public services’; to this extent, the 
social interest takes over profit maximization and makes the abovementioned tests 
unsuitable.224  
Before the Altmark case, any subsidy given to a company (private or public) 
for the realization of SGEIs was seen as State aid. However, the aid in question could 
have been approved if it fitted the conditions under Article 106(2) TFEU and it was 
previously notified to the Commission.225  
However, after the CJEU had delivered its reasoning on the Altmark case, the 
compensation for discharging public service does not constitute State aid, as far as a 
number of conditions are fulfilled.226 
The test in this case is that the recipient undertaking is demanded to provide 
public service (with clear defined tasks), the compensation must be calculated 
beforehand in an objective way and must not go beyond what is necessary to cover 
the incurred expenses.227 
However, where the firm carrying public service obligations is not picked in a 
public procurement procedure, the level of compensation needs to be figured out ‘on 
the basis of an analysis of the costs which a typical undertaking, well run’ would 
incur.228 
When it comes to price influencing, a measure meant to protect from cross 
subsidization in such situations is found in Directive 2005/81/EC, which modifies 
Directive 80/723/EEC. This piece of legislation requests any company receiving 
public compensation to separate the accounts used in the matter of duties for which it 
receives public compensation from the other ones used in other domains of activity;229 
if however companies do not comply with such request they can be excluded from the 
public procurement procedures on the basis of misusing State aid.  
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3.3.5 Procedural safeguards 
 
A last ‘filter’, more procedural this time and having the same purpose of 
assuring the best consideration in public contracts is the one focusing on the idea of a 
transparent and non-discriminatory tender. In the case of what can be perceived as a 
‘Procedural’ Test, the Court does not look at analogous market behavior or 
economical calculations but analyzes the procurement process per se. 
Basing its analysis frameworks for CJEU’s case law, the European 
Commission has created a presumption that no State aid incompatible with the law is 
present where the contract award represents a veridical procurement transaction and 
where the procurement procedure is in compliance with the EU Public Procurement 
Directives (e.g. MEAT criteria), to the extent that no economic advantage, which 
exceeds normal market conditions, is being given.230 
However, exceptions from this general rule may be found. For example, in the 
in Clonee/Kells Motorway case, even though the winning company in a public private 
construction partnership was chosen through a public procurement procedure (i.e. 
negotiated proceedings) this was not sufficient. As the economical outcome of that 
complex procedure was not totally predicted to that extent, the Commission stated 
that it cannot omit that the ‘financing measures proposed by authorities may confer an 
economic advantage’, and thereafter the financial scheme had to be notified.231  
The same conclusion had been reached in the Cumbria Broadband case. The 
fact that the service provider was to be appointed after a tendering procedure was not 
sufficient as the United Kingdome (here and after, the UK) authorities aimed at using 
a negotiated procedure. In the Commission’s view such procedures do not allow the 
calculation for the compensation beforehand and in an objective and transparent 
way’.232 
It can be interfered from the two-abovementioned examples that the 
Commission has a cautious view when the procedure involves a direct award of a 
contract that can experience major financial fluctuations as a result of the negotiations 
carried between the parties and of the changes in the project.233 	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Going further, in Parking Brixen case the CJEU, even though not analyzing 
the State aid issue, considered that the award of a public service concession without 
an awarding competition offered a discriminatory advantage to the receiving 
undertaking.  Even though the procurement directives do not include public service 
concession contracts, the bodies awarding them are bound by the general principles 
(e.g. transparency). 234  Furthermore, in order to avoid further issues, a new 
Concessions Directive has been adopted very recently.235 
Moving to the real estate sector, the Commission has created guidelines 
regarding the problem of State aid through sales of land and buildings by public 
authorities. In this sense, the standard procedure requires the sale to be carried 
‘through an unconditional bidding procedure’ which is enough well publicized and 
that can be compared to an auction; otherwise an independent expert evaluation would 
be needed. Moreover, in case of failure to sale, a decrease in price is allowed only to 
the extent of a 5% threshold.236 
However, extrapolating and drawing and analogy with the MEIP, when it 
comes to real estate, not only pricing can result in State aid. The fact that a public 
entity would buy a land plot and adapt it for industrial usage and after promise to 
purchase from the private company, that would subsequently locate there, a certain 
number of products manufactured un that area, made the Commission consider that 
the private undertaking had an advantage that it not had obtained otherwise on the 
market.237 
As it can be seen, this last ‘filter’ does not encompass too much economic 
analysis that widens the Court’s prerogatives when judging on the facts. Moreover, 
even though this last test looks quite rudimentary when compared with the other more 
sophisticated economical assessments, it is of special importance in cases where State 
aid comes as a result of corruption practices affecting transparency (e.g. award 
preceded by bribery).  
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As it will be seen in the last and final chapter, there are a wide variety of 
practices that can be categorized into both, corruption and antitrust behavior and that 
have considerable effects in distorting the compensation in public contracts. 
 
Chapter lll: Cartels and corruption related offences 
4.1 Defining the concept 
 
The scope of this final chapter is to develop on practices that evade the more 
complex economic sphere of, for example, dumping strategies, predation and State 
aid; the behavior analyzed in this chapter happen in the ‘backstage’ and has the scope 
of unlawfully affecting public tenders, privatization processes or generally, fair trade, 
by promoting uncompetitive or penal conduct.    
As a premise, competition can be understood as market situation in which the 
individual vendor or purchaser does not impact on the price by his acquisitions or 
sales. In other words, ‘the elasticity of supply facing any buyer is infinite, and the 
elasticity of demand facing any seller is infinite’;238 in this resort, high elasticity 
assures that supply is not ‘neutral’ to price changes and that potential clients can 
always shift to other sellers;239 this context is defined by economists as perfect 
competition as there is no market player strong enough to establish the compensation 
in a certain area of activity.240 
In this matter, the main antitrust laws (i.e. European and Nord American) may 
be paraphrased together as materializations of the principle that any ‘agreement, 
cooperative effort or intent’ developed by two or more entities that has the effect or is 
likely to affect or restrain their competitors is illegal.241      
The ‘hallmark’ of competition violations in both, USA and European 
jurisprudence is composed by practices such as: price-fixing among competitors and 
resale price fixing with distributors, division of market territories or group boycotts.242      	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Practice, p. 14. 
240 Ibid. 
241 Alfred F. Crotti, Trading Under US and EEC Antitrust Laws, (London, Butterworth & Co 
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Moreover, narrowing the discussion, EU Courts have deliberately refrained 
from interpreting the terms agreement and concerned practice in a formal or static 
way. 243  By giving primacy to a dynamic, invasive and effect-based approach, any 
contact between undertakings that is outside the fair trade principle can be punished. 
Narrowing the analysis, in relation to public procurement, engaging into cartel 
practices in order to avoid the competition exigencies can result in the creation of 
‘artificial, uneconomic and unstable industry structures, threaten sustainable 
employment, lower productivity gains and technological improvements’, 244 all of the 
detriment of taxpayers and of the society as a whole.  
However, in order to promote their own private interests, undertakings do 
associate in cartels that are essentially agreements between competitors with the 
purpose to coordinate their behavior on a certain market.245 These affiliations have 
direct impact on consumer’s interests as they lead to price fixing. Also, when this 
behavior concerns products that are bought by public authorities they may also affect 
taxpayers.246 
In this matter, collusion can be achieved if firms exchange data regarding the 
most important competition variables; shared information regarding the market 
structure, participants’ costs or different market strategies can lead to a harmful and 
anticompetitive transparency.247 
Besides this first way of influencing free trade, companies (through their 
representatives or stakeholders) might try to receive unlawful advantages by 
promoting a corrupt attitude towards the public decision-making actors.   
From a principal-agent theory perspective, such corruption is primarily 
referring to the use of government positions in order to achieve individual gains; 
where the agent (e.g. public servant or dignitary) empowered with the prerogatives of 
carrying out public duties by the principal (e.g. government and implicitly taxpayers) 
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gives primacy to his own, lato sensu, interests instead of assuring the common good, 
he engages into corruption practices.248  
From a public procurement perspective distinction must be made between 
political (high level) and administrative (bureaucratic) corruption. In an example, 
illegal behavior occurring while the resort budged is being elaborated reflects the 
political type of corruption while corrupt attitude embraced during the budgetary 
execution timetable (e.g. the way resources are spent) is perceived as being 
bureaucratic corruption.249 
Related to the public tenders, such behavior (occurring most of the time in the 
second stage) can cause inefficiencies that hinder competition; limiting the number of 
participants and, on the other hand, favoring the ones ‘with inside connections’ at the 
costs of neglecting the other efficient offers is proven to be damaging for the 
economic environment. 250 
Moreover, corruption lowers private investment and, as a consequence, it 
reduces the economic growth even in states with a high grade of bureaucracy and 
control (e.g. EU Member States)251. The Commission estimates that, within the 
Union, this phenomenon amounts at approximately EUR 120 billion per year.252 This 
is for sure in severe contradiction with the idea of ‘best value for money’ and injures 
consumer welfare proportional with the huge amount lost. Besides the economic 
impact, corruption in public tenders can also engage bad solutions like approving 
projects that have negative environmental effects, reduce the incentives for innovation 
or neglect the social needs.253   
However, as a matter of economic reality, the most desired business position is 
to have a protected exclusive market. In such a context, the undertaking is the 
principal supplier in a certain territory and as a consequence ‘enjoys the bliss of non-
competitive pricing’.254  
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Having this as a premise, a company can assure market comfort by abusing its 
dominance (e.g. predatory pricing as already discussed) or can also proceed to other 
strategies in order to achieve the abovementioned aim.  In this matter, having the 
possibility of accessing such a consistent market, there are sufficiently enough reasons 
for which an undertaking would bribe public officials when involved in a public 
tender. 
For example, by offering illegal incentives, a firm representative can 
determine the public servant to include the company in the short list of undertakings 
qualified to participate, give him confidential information, customize the tender 
documentation in relation to the company’s offer or tolerate implementation 
irregularities.255 
On the other hand, the increasing dimension of corporate governance 
worldwide is determining undertakings to focus on anti-corruption policies as part of 
their functioning, with the scope of taking care of their reputation and also for 
aligning the interests of management and shareholders. 256  Furthermore, as the 
sanctions in such cases (i.e. antitrust and criminal) are more severe (e.g. fines that can 
amount to 10% of the company’s total turnover in the preceding business year257 or 
imprisonment for the offender) and can also be cumulated without breaching the ne 
bis in idem principle258, undertakings and private entrepreneurs are facing the most 
punitive liability framework discussed so far in this paper.   
 
4.2 Cartels 
 
Cartels can be deﬁned as secret agreements that are established between 
potential market rivals with the sole scope of not competing between each other.259 
Generally, cartels are active in markets where ‘the product is homogenous and the 
number of industry participants is limited’.260  
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Applying this typology to the procurement area, bidders are often gathering 
themselves into cartels and try to influence the award decision in the interest of one of 
the participants; this happens without however involving any public servant in the 
equation. 261 In consequence, cross borders cartels ‘harmonize the conditions of 
competitions’ and have negative effects on the interpenetration of trade by 
‘cementing’ just one artificial trade pattern.262   
An agreement can be sanctioned if there is consensus on a plan that can limit 
commercial freedom.263 In its casuistic, the Commission has developed the idea that a 
company’s attendance in meeting at which anti-competitive agreements were 
concluded gives rise to a presumption of engagement in such practice and is for the 
defendants to prove the opposite.264  
The general rule is that where the aim of hindering normal competition can be 
interfered, that is enough proof for reveling ‘violence’; moreover, where the business 
strategy is such that it should illegal impact on prices that is also enough. 
Furthermore, where not sure about the legality of the conduct, the actual effect is the 
one prevailing in the analysis.265 
Narrowing the assessment, bid rigging is placed at the forefront of the cartel 
practices. Even though other strategies such as price fixing, territory or consumer 
allocation or product output have a severe impact on the public procurement market, 
bid rigging is intrinsically linked with the tender procedures and represents the 
standard way of antitrust fraud in this resort. Furthermore, as it shall be seen, in some 
cases, bid rigging comes as an instrument of implementing such fraudulent strategies.  
For example, in an auction regarding a national health programme, the fact 
that three distributors from the same pharmaceutical manufacturer did not compete, as 
each participant offered a different product from the same supplier (i.e. no 
interchangeability between them) was considered to fit the test for market-sharing 
cartels.266 
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Having regard to structural characteristics, bid-rigging cartels are substantially 
more stable. This happens due to the fact that in regular markets, both, quotas and 
prices need to be agreed on while in bidding markets the volume is established by the 
awarding authority and participants know that, in most of the cases, by decreasing 
prices they just increase their profit once (fact that does not have effect on the 
quantities they intend to sell in the future).267 
Going deeper in the analysis, one of their preferred practices is ‘cover 
pricing’; this represents the case where one company which is not willing to win the 
contract helps a rival by submitting an economically viable but unsuccessful bid.  
Cover pricing has the purpose of misleading public authorities to consider that they 
face higher competitive bidding than they actually do.268 
Furthermore, other unlawful practices can take the form of ‘bid suppression’, 
when competitor agree not to participate or withdrawn their offer in favor of one 
bidder, ‘bid rotation’ when each member is waiting his turn to ‘win’ a contract or 
‘market allocation’ where bidders agree not to compete in particular markets.269 
Exemplifying, while proving such fraudulent behavior, the UK Office of Faire 
Trade (here and after, OFT) fined more than one hundred construction firms in 
England with the total sum of approximately £130 million. The investigation revealed 
about two hundred compromised tenders in a period of about six years; the inspectors 
also found particular cases in which the winners paid an a priori compensation to the 
losing bidder. As a consequence, this generalized practice affected building projects 
estimated at approximately £200 million (i.e. public schools, universities, 
hospitals).270 
In another cartel case from the Czech Republic, the NCA fined several 
companies for arranging a service tender organized by the Defense Ministry. The 
facts were that one of the cartel members (i.e. cartel leader) gave the other firms 
forms that were indicating the prices that they to offer and which were actually 
submitted.271  	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A similar case can be found in the Romanian jurisprudence; in a tender 
concerning the ‘construction, repair and maintenance of natural gas pipelines’ the 
Romanian Competition Authority, while applying article 101 TFEU in parallel with 
the national provisions, fined with  €5,6 million four companies that participated in 
two public procurement procedures (i.e. organized by the state owned operator on 
gas). After obtaining data from the prosecutor’s office, the NCA initiated 
investigations (i.e. searching emails272) and discovered that the horizontal cartel 
distorted competition by object as the parties exchanged sensitive information (i.e. the 
financial offers) and afterwards coordinated their market conduct.273 
Going further with the examples, in Italy, a Local Health Authority notified 
the NCA that there was a suspicious similarity of the prices asked by the undertakings 
participating in a tender regarding ‘non-ionic radiopaque agents for radiological use’. 
After carrying investigations, the NCA revealed a framework of common pricing that 
inter alia included the coordination of some of their product promotions, the 
exchange of information on the quotas sold and also bid rotation. In proving such 
collusive behavior, the NCA relied on the ‘vertical correspondence’ that the firms had 
with the local agents and also, on the data exchanged by the two parties regarding the 
market information. It concluded that there was ‘price parallelism’ and in certain 
cases ‘exclusive tendering’ fact that made the NCA impose a fine amounting at 5,5% 
of the undertakings’ turnover on the relevant pharmaceutical market.274 
Furthermore, practitioners have decided that where are suspiciously high 
prices, big differences or too much similarity between the tenders, constant winning 
firms, questionable subcontract practices or suspect joint tenders, public authorities 
might be facing bid rigging practices. 275   
When looking at the statistics, a study made in France years ago shows that at 
a number of about 170000 public tenders there were only 15 prosecutions against 
cartels; the low level of enforcement is based on the difficulty of proving such illegal 
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members’ incentives to denounce the cartel becomes essential.276  Leniency programs 
have the effect of exonerating or reducing the fines for the cartel participants that 
bring evidence against the unlawful practices.277 However, as leniency applications 
are more usual when a cartel lacks stability, leniency is not that popular in the bid 
rigging area.278 
The situation becomes even more difficult where companies collude by 
avoiding direct communication and cooperate without complete mutual 
understanding. Moreover, as explicit collusion (i.e. cartel) is unlawful and tacit 
collusion (i.e. collective dominance) is usually hard to prove (e.g. price leadership), 
undertakings in oligopolistic markets realize that it is within the benefit of all the 
undertakings to preserve a high price or to hinder vigorous price competition.279 
The cartel secrecy is meant to protect the firms from severe punishment that, 
as seen before, can amount to millions of Euros. In the same time, as it will be 
developed further, the fines coming as a result of breaching the competition rules can 
be cumulated with sanctions of criminal nature, developing the most punitive liability 
framework analyzed so far in this paper. Moreover, the new procurement legislation 
provides that ‘where the contracting authority has sufficiently plausible indications 
(i.e. from NCA or Commission) to conclude that the economic operators have entered 
into agreements280 aimed at distorting competition’, it may exclude them from the 
tender.281  
 
4.3 Ne bis in idem 
 
Starting, it has been established that parallel or consecutive proceedings (i.e. 
from NCAs and Commission as members of the European Competition Network) 
carried in the same case are possible and sometimes suggested by the Competition 
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law provisions enacted in Regulation 1/2003 and by the subsequent case law.282 This 
means that each and every investigation ends up with its own sanction, proportionate 
to the geographical market and the period of time in which the anticompetitive 
behavior incurred.283  
Article 23(5) of Regulation 1 from 2003 stipulates that decisions that impose 
sanctions for infringements ‘shall not be of criminal law nature’. Per a contrario, this 
textual reading, embraced by the CJEU as well284, suggests that the fines and the 
subsequent procedure are administrative in nature.285 
However, recently, in the Menarini case, the European Court of Human Right, 
confirmed the application of Article 6(1) of the ECHR, regarding the ‘right to a fair 
trial in criminal cases’ to competition law procedures.286 However, the decision 
demonstrates the ‘immediate relevance of fundamental rights’ to EU competition law 
enforcement287  and is meant to influence the Union judicature’s review of the 
Commission’s decisions.288  
As it can be seen, the decision comes mainly as a procedural remedy and is not 
affecting the possibility of cumulating the Competition law liability with further 
criminal sanctions. In this matter, for cases like bid rigging that can fall under both, 
criminal and administrative liability, a company involved in such practice can end up 
by being sanctioned by his NCA (where this is a non-penal body) and Commission 
(i.e. antitrust) while its representatives can be subject in a criminal trial under the 
penal legislation (e.g. machinations in public tenders).   
Moreover, nowadays, when it comes to the nature of the punishment, there is a 
growing tendency for Union NCAs to promote individual liability. In Belgium, 
starting with this year, the NCA will be able to fine individuals up to €10,000 for 
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taking part in ‘hard core’ infringements while in Poland the fine threshold for cartel 
involvement is planned to be €500,000.289 
Furthermore, considering cartels just ‘another form of theft’, some Member 
States criminalized the competition law enforcement (e.g. Estonia, UK, and 
Germany), fact that assures a more efficient general prevention and discourages such 
acts.290 
For example, in ABB Asea Brown Boveri Ltd v Commission the CJEU, when 
assessed on the company’s behavior of price fixing, of allocating individual projects 
to pre-established producers and manipulating the awarding procedure, concluded that 
it was dealing with a cartel within the meaning of article 101 TFEU.291 Furthermore, 
besides the punitive fines imposed by the Commission292 for running a cartel, judicial 
authorizes from Germany imposed a final prison sentence of about three years and an 
additional fine of €100,000 for the main defendant, fact that was meant to fully 
compensate with the market harm caused.293 
 
4.4 Corruption in Public Procurement  
 
Besides the severe economic effects developed, corruption has also 
implications when it comes to the public opinion. Citing from a recent study, 56 % of 
the Member States’ population interviewed in the 2013 Eurobarometer survey say 
that the ‘only way to succeed in business is through political connections’.294  
Even though more than half of the Europeans have this negative view, 
corruption has been on the Union’s agenda ever since 1997; however, the 2003 and 
2011 Commission Communication (i.e. soft law) on a comprehensive anti-corruption 
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policy have been more of political instruments with disappointing results when it 
comes to the actual implementation.295 
Facing lack of efficiency, the Commission tries to enforce anti-corruption 
policies by incorporating them in its proposed sectorial legislation.  For example, in 
line with the already implemented Directives, the new legislation preserves grounds 
for mandatory exclusion such as: ‘participation in a criminal organization, corruption, 
fraud, and money laundering’.296 
Having a teleological analysis, in most of the cases a participant offer bribes in 
order to receive a contract. In this matter, bribes are identified as consistent amounts 
of money given to the public servants with the hope of receiving a favorable decision 
where there is no fundament for such outcome.297 Also, bribes are most of the times 
calculated in terms of percentages of the final contract (i.e. kickbacks).298 
The mechanisms of giving bribes is a ‘generous’ one; first, money can be 
transferred to accounts located in places with high secrecy (e.g. Switzerland) or can 
follow a ‘laundering’ circuit. For example, the giver might have to buy overestimated 
goods or assets from the receiver’s entourage (e.g. land) or might have to fictitiously 
subcontract works to companies indirectly controlled by the corrupt official. 
However, when it comes to this last practice, the new legislation provides for the 
tenderer ‘to indicate in its tender any proposed subcontractors’, fact that would at least 
signal the beginning of a fraudulent intent.299 
 However, when analyzing more complex markets (e.g. infrastructure, 
construction) where the preparation period is more lengthy, such illegal incentives 
may be paid gradually at particular stages of the process; exemplifying, their purpose 
might be to impact on the tendering process at an early time and ‘manipulate’ the 
design of the documentation or receive information already decide upon.300 Moreover, 
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the practice of, at a future stage, receiving data about other competitors’ submitted 
tenders have developed ‘well-remunerated information networks’.301  
As a useful remedy, the new legislation provides that ‘where the economic 
operator has undertaken to influence the awarding authority in order to obtain 
confidential information that may confer an undue advantages’, he can also be 
excluded.302 
On the other hand, not only information is desirable in such context; carrying 
the tender during regular vacation, fact preceded by a very short deadline for offer 
submission can be seen as a form of deliberate advantage.303 Also, in opposition to 
experience and efficiency, the admittance on a contract shortlist (i.e. prequalification) 
can also be conditional on a bribe.304 In a Commission report it has been stated that 
‘insufficient transparency at all stages, excessively short deadlines, changes to the 
initial information of the tender procedure that are published only at national level, 
excessively strict selection criteria and artificial algorithms for evaluation of tenders’ 
are all perceived as high risk corruption indicators.305 With regard to these facts and in 
order to increase efficiency and transparency, the European Commission released a 
communication providing with a strategy to make e-procurement (i.e. electronic 
procurement) the rule in the Union by the middle of 2016.306 
Exemplifying on the case law, in Norway, an engineer working for the 
national petroleum company and organizing procurement for coating services 
received bribes in the equivalent of EUR 50.000 from two private CEOs for the scope 
of influencing the tender procedure. In consequence, all three of them were sentenced 
to about one year in jail.307 This case is the perfect example for administrative 
corruption; on the other hand, high-level political corruption is also identifiable in 
public procurement. 
 In this matter, the former Slovenian prime minister has been sentenced to two 
years in jail for receiving about EUR 2 million from a Finish (state owned) arm 
dealer. The public contract referred to 135 armored personnel carriers worth about  	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EUR 280 million. Adding, the contract was cancelled after the lack of compliance 
with Directive 2009/81/EC on defense and sensitive security procurement had been 
revealed.308  
Going further in the analysis of political corruption, last year, the Romanian 
Constitutional Court declared certain amendments imposed by the Parliament to the 
penal code to be unconstitutional; these modifications, meant to ‘immunize’ political 
actors, eliminated parliamentarians from the scope of the status of ‘public officials’ 
with the effect that they would no longer be prosecuted for corruption in the public 
sector.309  
Turning back and analyzing the final stage of the contract negotiations, in case 
where the briber outbids in order to receive the award, there are instruments (i.e. 
additional acts) to reestablish the fraudulent ex ante-negotiated conditions. In some 
cases, even though satisfied with the agreement status quo, the contractor might 
however try to manipulate decisions regarding modifications to the original project as 
in case of success he will increase the enterprise profits (e.g. incorporation of new 
works).310  
In this resort, the CJEU in Nachrichtenagentur case states that amendments to 
the already signed agreement must be ‘that materially different in character from the 
original contract’ such as to show the intention of the contracting parties to proceed to 
renegotiations regarding the essential terms of the agreement’.311  
Exemplifying, statistics made in Romania show that between 2010 and 2011 
for 96 works contracts were concluded 203 addendums of which 23 were aimed at 
changing the contract value (e.g. increasing it with 50%).312 As discussed in the First 
Chapter, such renegotiations can be perceived as ‘new contracts’ or as simulate state 
aid, both followed by administrative remedies; however, if fraudulent intent is proven, 
criminal liability can also be engaged.  
There are circumstances in which, in order to reduce costs without 
renegotiations and in complicity with the awarding authority (who makes the quality 	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checks before taking over) the winning company might decrease the standard of the 
services or works agreed upon (i.e. proportional with the amount offered as bribe) and 
be tolerated by the work auditor in its unlawful endeavor.313  
Going further, corrupt authorities can take advantage of emergency 
procurement (e.g. flood, earthquake, snow storm) as this situation involves fast 
transfer of funds, permitted lack of compliance with the standard procurement 
procedures and a lot public emotion that shifts the attention.314 In certain cases, public 
authorities exaggerate the emergency just to create the legal framework in order to 
foster their corrupt plans. By using motives like ‘the continued threat to human life’ 
they can take advantage of ‘fast-track’ emergency procedures and give preference to 
their own ‘clientele’ (e.g. mostly supply contracts).315 
Continuing with the analysis, besides the classical public servant – 
entrepreneur agreements, smaller towns from eastern Europe face issues as organized 
crime infiltration which are synonym to ‘violence, threats and collusion with local 
authorities’, all of them injuring impartial and transparent procurement procedures by 
keeping the potential candidates away from the actual tenders.316 
Extrapolating, corruption can also appear during the process of preparation 
(i.e. Commission), debate (e.g. Parliament) or implementation (i.e. national level) of a 
piece of legislation (e.g. Directive). In this matter, as in the above-mentioned case, the 
corruption manifests itself at a pure political level and has as scope the enactment of a 
‘weak’ piece of legislation (e.g. leaving a wide margin of discretion to the awarding 
authorities). For example, in 2011 a member of the Social Democrats political group 
(European Parliament) accepted the idea of receiving €100,000 each year for the 
scope of proposing certain amendments and voting against other in accordance with 
the interest of a certain firm.317  
Moreover, having a look over the new legislation firms can be excluded from 
tenders for ‘grave professional misconduct’, rendering their integrity (e.g. breach of 
intellectual property rights), conflict of interest (i.e. ‘financial, economic or other 	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personal interest’), and deceptive attitude in presenting justifying documentation (e.g. 
false portfolio).318 Having these new provisions incorporated in the new Directives’ 
text, it can be said that the Union legislator perceives it as serious danger. However, 
as in the case of bid rigging cartels, corruption in public procurement is difficult to 
monitor. In this matter, it can be assumed that the illegal incentives received by the 
functionaries, dignitaries or politicians are only the ‘tip of the iceberg’.319 
 
4.5 Corruption in liberalized markets 
 
Evers since the liberalization of Romanian rail freight that started in 2001, the 
private investors entering the market decreased the state company’s market shares 
from 100% in 2001 to 49,9 years later.320  
Considering those facts it can be said that, prima facie, private firms activating 
in this resort put significant competitive pressure on the former monopolist 
undertaking fact that is in complete accordance with the Union economic trends.  
However, this is not always the case; sometimes, the market pressure is 
replaced by illegal practices developed by the private undertakings upon the poorly 
managed public companies. This was the case where the owner of a private 
undertaking activating on the same market tried fixing a bid in order to favor his 
company against the state – owned ‘CFR Marfa’. 
 By using a third person, he tried to find out from the public company’s CEO 
the price that was to be delivered by CFR Marfa in a sealed bid procedure for a 
contract of coal transport estimated at about EUR 50 million over a period of 3 
years; 321  it must be said that the sealed bids procedure is an ‘arm’s lengths 
competition over price’, without the chance for revision of bids; two or more bidders 
are involved to submit their best bid by a sealed bidding process.322 
The legal qualification of his endeavor was considered to be of influence 
buying. This crime is linked with trading in influence which most of the jurisdictions 
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define ‘as a corrupt trilateral relationship’ in which an individual with real or alleged 
influence on other persons (e.g. public managers, politicians) offers this possibility of 
influencing in exchange for money or other benefices.323  
Going further, there are other cases in which poor management and corruption 
‘intertwine’. For example, there are cases in which market liberalization happens in a 
brutal way due to the fact that public authorities and managers commit themselves to 
undermine the functioning of public bodies. This was the situation in the CET case 
where deliberate unfavorable legislation and not diligent management lead to the 
bankruptcy of the public local heating company (CET Iasi324). The fact that the 
undertaking had higher expenses in relation to its economic status, lost a great deal of 
finances in reckless operation and was underfinanced by the local authorities325, all of 
them with the purpose of keeping, as much as possible the Gcal326 price at a low level 
(for electoral reasons) and after for assuring free way to a private investor got the 
attention of the prosecutors.327 As a result, the public managers were accused of 
deliberate bankruptcy and are faced criminal prosecution. 
Summing up, it can be seen that corruption can take multiple forms and it can 
affect the price criteria in both, public procurement contracts and also in the process 
of liberalizing markets and, as a result of this, increase the costs for taxpayers, reduce 
the quality of the final product/service and reduce popular trust in the process per 
se.328 
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Conclusion 
 
With regard to what has been presented, it can be interfered that there are lots 
of elements that can unbalance the consideration in a public (either procurement of 
privatization) contract.  
Advantages that an economic operator can derive from breaching social, 
environmental, fiscal or intellectual property regulations have direct effect on the 
public tenders. Even though these companies become competitive enough to propose 
lower prices (in comparison with companies respecting the law) and the public 
authority receives a higher price for its demand, this kind of practice has, on the long 
term, a very damaging effect on the market. Tolerating such practice without a prompt 
and early intervention, companies engaging themselves into such behavior can first of 
all threaten legal certainty and secondarily, generate an artificial oligopoly or, in 
worst-case scenario, a monopoly that will enable them to charge higher prices ex 
nunc. 
This effect is the same as the one that undertakings develop after being 
successful in predatory strategies and implicitly in abusing their dominance. As a 
result, it is equally important to keep under control any market behavior that can give 
way to exclusionary facts.  
In the same time, tax avoidance, alike other advantages - subsidies, debt 
release - can be the result of state intervention on the market. In certain cases, such 
economical discriminatory policies (i.e. state aid) have the effect of artificially 
keeping on the market firms that underperform and do not have the strength to involve 
themselves in a fair market competition. Applied to the procurement area, this can be 
reflected in the final price that is delivered, which can evade normal economic 
efficiency calculations and disadvantage regular market operators. Furthermore, 
Member States can also ‘deliver’ such aid while lowering the price and imposing 
binding conditions (e.g. social) in privatization operations.  
Continuing, when considering the links with Competition law, the rules on 
State aid and article 102 TFEU (i.e. predatory pricing) are not the only one of interest; 
in this resort, agreements between undertakings (i.e. cartels) have a direct impact on 
prices by making them rise as a result of non-competitive biding. In contrast with the 
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issues discussed above, the effects take place on the very short term as no major 
economical machination (e.g. cross subsidization) is involved. 
On the other hand, there are elements that, even though evading complex 
economical mechanisms have the same harmful result of influencing the 
consideration. In this matter, the ex ante corrupt agreements (e.g. based on bribes) and 
the ex post contractual hold-ups are materialized in lower value for money due to the 
fact that in each case the price increases or the quality are weakened in the detriment 
of taxpayers.  
As it can be seen, there are mechanisms that have the effect of rising the price 
in a very brutal way on the short run as there are other strategies that, even though 
prima facie have the effect of lowering prices, create artificial economical 
environments that will injure competition and consumer welfare on the long run. 
However, it must be emphasized that both categories are as harmful and, in 
order to achieve what the Commission codifies as ‘best value for money’, equal 
attention should be paid in combating any of the abovementioned practices.  
In the same time, due to the fact that most of the practices are linked between 
them, authorities need to cooperate (i.e. NCAs, prosecutors, awarding authorities and 
even intelligence) in an efficient and effective way and not be overwhelmed by the 
complexity of the problem. Moreover, as nowadays we are face cross-border 
ramifications of the different groups involved, Member States must be prepared to 
cooperate in cross boarder logic. 
In the author’s view and having regard to the huge amounts of money spent in 
public procurement, further research should be developed in the matter of the 
possibility of creating functional institutional networks that would have within reach 
multiple instruments that can help identify the vulnerabilities from an early stage and 
not just intervene when the ‘tip of the iceberg’ is seen. Moreover, public 
procurement/privatization represent strategic procedures and must be protected with 
maximum energy by involving much more public resources and know-how. 
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